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NEITHER JUSTICE, NOR OASIS:  
ALGERIA’S AMNESTY LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
he notion that justice shall be done, regardless of its looming real 
world effects, is not a recent phenomenon: It is ancient. As early 
as 43 B.C., the statesman Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus is  
attributed as having stated, fiat justitia ruat cœlum—“let justice be done, 
though heaven should fall.”1 Setting aside this maxim as outdated, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
instead drew from Hegel’s maxim, fiat justitia ne pereat mundus—“let 
justice be done lest the world should perish.”2 The critical responses to 
and tension between these two Latin phrases largely informs the debate 
this Note treats, namely, whether there can be amnesties for international 
crimes, and more particularly, whether Algeria’s 2006 amnesty law  
conflicts with a duty to prosecute such grave violations. 
Humanitarian and human rights law is presently struggling through an 
enforcement crisis. After the Nuremberg Trials, the world witnessed a 
sprawling gap in accountability that has only more recently been broken 
with the landmark formation of the ICTY, International Criminal  
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”), and International Criminal Court (“ICC”), among other  
significant developments.3 Nevertheless, amnesty laws4 have been and 
                                                                                                             
 1. “Let justice be done, though the world perish,” The Columbia World of  
Quotations, no. 21998, 1996, available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/98/21998.html. 
This maxim was later adopted as the motto of Ferdinand I (1558–1564) in the  
permutation, fiat justitia et pereat mundus, id., and also invoked by Lord Mansfield in his 
historic 1772 judgment declaring the unlawfulness of slavery. STEVEN M. WISE, THOUGH 
THE HEAVENS MAY FALL: THE LANDMARK TRIAL THAT LED TO THE END OF HUMAN 
SLAVERY 173 (2005). 
 2. See Antonio Cassese, The Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, para. 18, Nov. 14, 
1994, http://www.un.org/icty/rapportan/first-94.htm. 
 3. In addition, the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court is active. The Ad-Hoc Court for East 
Timor and Special Tribunal for Cambodia have also been set up. Although, the former 
has been highly criticized by human rights advocates as a diversionary front. Ad-Hoc 
Court for East Timor, Global Policy Forum, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/eti 
morindx.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). The latter body issued its first indictment in 
July 2007. Nic Dunlop, Cambodia’s Trial by Fire, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007. There 
have been serious issues with the tribunal, however, which has prompted the U.N. to 
threaten withdrawal of support. Guy De Launey, UN Warning on Cambodia Tribunal, 
BBC, Oct. 2, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7023303.stm. 
 4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92–93 (8th ed. 2004). Generally defined, amnesty is a 
“forgetfulness, oblivion; an intentional overlooking” and is etymologically related to the 
T
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continue to be passed in countries with serious records of human rights 
crimes,5 reducing or eliminating punishment for perpetrators of these 
abuses. Supporters of amnesty laws maintain that retributive justice may 
not be required because “the heavens” will otherwise fall even further: 
Such laws may be necessary to end recurrent violence within a state. 
Amnesties then function strategically to aide the state’s transition,  
theoretically to a more just and prosperous society. On the other hand, 
opponents argue that amnesties threaten “the world” to the extent that 
they spawn a widespread deficit of justice and undermine the essence of 
humanity. 
From 1992 to 1998,6 Algeria experienced a “dirty war”7 that claimed 
the lives of between 100,000 to 200,000 people, and in which tens of 
thousands more were brutalized. In 2006, fourteen years after the  
initiation of the conflict, the controversial Charter for Peace and National 
Reconciliation (“the Charter”) was put into effect. Introduced by  
President Abdelaziz Boutiflika, the Charter granted broad amnesty for 
select universal crimes committed during the war.8 A Draft Charter,  
released six months prior, explicitly justified this measure as vital, if not 
necessary to lead Algeria permanently out of chaos.9 
The present Note seeks to address meaningfully whether this  
legislation is legally valid to the extent that it shields prosecutions.10  
                                                                                                             
Greek word for oblivion or not remembering. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1989). Contrastingly, a pardon is legally defined as “[t]he act or an instance of officially 
nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime. A pardon is usu[ally] 
granted by the chief executive of a government.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 5. See infra Part III(f). 
 6. While these are the years that witnessed the worst of the violence, arguably  
Algeria’s conflict has not completely ceased. See infra Part IV and Conclusion. 
 7. “Dirty war” most accurately describes what the country underwent. This term has 
been defined as “an offensive conducted by secret police or the military of a regime 
against revolutionary and terrorist insurgents and marked by the use of kidnapping and 
torture and murder with civilians often being the victims.” The Free Online Dictionary, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dirty+war (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). For an analysis 
concerning why Algeria’s conflict should not be considered a “civil war,” see HUGH 
ROBERTS, ALGERIA’S VEILED DRAMA, reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–
2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 250, 254–59 (Verso) (2003). 
 8. See infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra note 59, pmbl. 
 10. At least two scholars have concluded that the Charter should not be recognized, 
however they have done so after analysis based on non-legal criteria. See Valerie  
Arnould, Amnesty, Peace and Reconciliation in Algeria, 227 CONFLICT, SECURITY & 
DEV. 253 (2007); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 283 (2007). 
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Part I provides essential background on Algeria, its political and social 
history leading up to adoption of the Charter as well as the context and 
substance of the Charter itself. Focusing on the particular violations the 
Charter amnesties, Part II analyzes whether a duty to prosecute these 
crimes exists under the international and multilateral treaties to which 
Algeria is a party. After establishing the incompatibility of the Charter 
and these agreements, Part III then scrutinizes the present status of  
customary law to find that states have an obligation to prosecute the most 
serious war crimes as well as crimes against humanity. Addressing  
several of the most prevalent policy issues, this section also argues in 
favor of a broad customary duty to prosecute. Finally, Part IV begins 
with an analysis of whether the Charter can be considered to amnesty 
grave war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Dir-
ty War, and concludes by suggesting that a duty to prosecute should be 
and is consistent with the wishes of many of Algeria’s victims. 
I. ALGERIA: THROUGH TURMOIL TO THE PRESENT 
A. Pre-Independence Algeria: A Brief Historical Account 
Algeria’s struggle for independence has profoundly shaped Algerian 
politics and society. France occupied Algeria from 1830 until 1962 when 
it was forced to give up its departments after eight years of one of the 
bitterest conflicts within its formerly colonized lands.11 Faced with a  
colonial regime that relegated Algerians to second-class status12 and 
trampled over the native population’s sense of culture and tradition, in 
late 1954, support for an independent Algerian state coalesced into active 
                                                                                                             
 11. According to official Algerian estimates, the war resulted in 300,000 orphans, 
400,000 refugees, 700,000 migrants, and 3 million displaced people. BENJAMIN STORA, 
ALGERIA 1830–2000: A SHORT HISTORY, 110–11 (Jane Marie Todd trans., Cornell U. 
Press 2001). Although the most reliable assessment of total casualties during the war, 
both French and Algerian, civil and military, is approximately 500,000, most of whom 
were Algerian, id., the ruling party’s figure of 1 million Algerian deaths became widely 
accepted. This figure became so central to the country’s reputation, for example, that 
Algeria is commonly referred to in Arabic as balad milyūn mujāhidīn, “country of a  
million freedom fighters.” 
 12. “The colons enjoyed full rights; the colonized were ‘subjects’ not ‘citizens,’ liable 
to special provisions: tallage, corvée, and detention . . . without due process. In 1881, a 
Code de l’Indigénat (Native Code) was established, regularizing these repressive  
measures.” Id. at 6. By 1955, for example, and according to French statistics, only 8 out 
of the 2000 workers in the general state government were native Algerians. For every 
15,342 indigenous Algerians, only 1 attended school, as opposed to 1 for every 227 Eu-
ropeans living in the country. An Algerian made twenty-eight times less in gross  
income than a European resident. Id. at 39. 
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resistance, led by the Front de Libération Nationale (“FLN”).13 The fight 
for independence eventually came to a close in a ceasefire in March 
1962. This ceasefire was followed by a referendum on July 1, 1962, in 
which 6 million people voted in favor of Algeria becoming an  
independent state, with 16,534 objecting.14 Soon after, a sequence of  
decrees was issued, amnestying grave offenses carried out by Algerian 
and French forces in Algeria.15 
In keeping with popular revolutionary sentiment, though it was initially 
mobilized to overthrow French colonial rule, the Algerian army proved 
to endure in strength, dominating Algerian politics to date with a power 
difficult to underestimate. Similarly, the FLN emerged to become the 
sole ruling party in post-independence Algeria, building its legitimacy 
upon a constructed legacy that it exclusively liberated the Algerian  
people from colonial domination and founded the modern Algerian 
state.16 This narrative long held immense appeal among not only  
Algerians outraged by pervasive economic, political, and cultural  
subjugation, but also other states of the global South, with which Algeria 
                                                                                                             
 13. Insurrection began in November 1954 in a series of well-organized, concurrent 
attacks by the FLN. Id. at 35–36. Riots in over two-dozen villages and towns followed in 
August 1955. Id. at 43–44. France responded by sending in troops, strengthening its  
security forces, and in March 1956, voting into effect a law providing for “special  
powers,” which forebodingly set aside the majority of safeguards for individual liberties 
in Algeria. Id. at 44, 46. The FLN subsequently began a string of attacks in the capital, in 
what infamously became known as the Battle of Algiers. While the FLN engaged in  
guerilla warfare tactics, including bombings of European civilians, French paratroopers 
struggled to put down the insurgency, which it succeeded in doing by September 1957, 
however not without practicing routine torture and disappearing approximately 3000 
people. Id. at 47, 49, 50–52. The French also placed tens of thousands of Algerians in 
detention camps without due process. Id. at 53. Violence continued to be exchanged not 
only between the French and Algerian forces, but also between Algerian political  
factions. Id. at 59. In August 1956, though, other active parties and groups were  
assimilated into the FLN, persuaded by the party that a single, greater unity was  
necessary if Algeria was to overcome the strength of the French forces. Id. at 60–61. A 
revamped armed branch of the FLN then spread throughout the country, fighting under 
daunting conditions. Id. at 61–62. 
 14. Id. at 97–98, 104. 
 15. Id. at 113. For translated text of some of the key decrees as well as an account of 
the strained evolution of French-Algerian relations vis-à-vis Algeria’s War of  
Independence, see Shiva Eftekhari, Note, France and the Algerian War: From a Policy of  
“Forgetting” to a Framework for Accountability, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 413, 
424–26 (2003). 
 16. The accuracy of this nationalist “myth” put forth by the FLN is questionable, as 
other key players were also influential. ROBERT MALLEY, THE CALL FROM ALGERIA: 
THIRD WORLDISM, REVOLUTION AND THE TURN TO ISLAM, 34–35 (1996). 
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actively aligned itself.17 Over time, however, the perpetual  
commemoration of and struggle for greater freedom from external  
oppression was unable to overcome hardships within the Algerian state. 
B. Algeria’s Dirty War 
In the mid-1980s the revolutionary socialist government began to face 
mounting discontent, brought about by a combination of economic  
troubles18 and general estrangement from an ossified and corrupt  
regime.19 In October 1988, this discontent erupted across the country in 
riots and demonstrations against state power. After nearly a week, the 
army was called in: More than 500 people, mostly youths, were killed.20 
The regime also retaliated by torturing people on a widespread basis, a 
fact the government itself later admitted.21 President Chadli Benjedid’s 
response astounded many. Benjedid introduced a series of reforms, the 
most notable of which was a new constitution in 1989 that secured  
essential freedoms and granted the right to form political associations.22 
Algeria then witnessed a swell of civil society participation that called 
into question post-independence power dynamics. Numerous political 
opposition parties, both secular and Islamist, were registered.23 
In June 1990, free multiparty local elections took place for the first 
time in Algeria’s history, elections in which the Front Islamique du Salut 
(“FIS”), a party with an Islamist platform, won a majority.24 With  
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 141–49, 210. 
 18. By 1986, oil prices had dropped dramatically, which, in a non-diversified  
economy, meant that the Algerian state could not continue its program of social welfare 
as it had in its prime. Id. at 208–09. 
 19. For example, in 1991, “the former prime minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, claimed 
that government officials had siphoned off [twenty-six] billion dollars, [a sum] equivalent 
to the amount of Algeria’s foreign debt.” MARTIN STONE, THE AGONY OF ALGERIA, 108 
(1997). 
 20. Human Rights in Algeria, Testimony by Tom Malinowski to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 4, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/ 
03/04/algeri10260.htm. 
 21. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1992, Human Rights Watch, http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Mew-01.htm#P71_39546 (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 22. MICHAEL WILLIS, THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE IN ALGERIA: A POLITICAL HISTORY, 
111–12 (1996). This move should not necessarily be construed as the initiation of a  
genuine democratic transition. Instead, it was likely pushed by the army, which arguably 
viewed political reforms as a strategy to fragment dissent, thereby preserving its  
dominance. See, e.g., Rolf Schwarz, Human Rights Discourse and Practice as Crisis 
Management: Insights from the Algerian Case, 7 J. N. AFR. STUD. 57, 66–67 (2002). 
 23. STORA, supra note 11, at 198–99. 
 24. For a thorough history of the development of Islamist politics in Algeria, see 
WILLIS, supra note 22. While treatment of the FIS’s popularity is beyond the scope of 
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parliamentary elections approaching, the FIS held demonstrations against 
the regime’s manipulation of the process. This prompted the army to  
impose martial law and imprison FIS leadership in June 1991.25 The first 
round of parliamentary elections was nevertheless held in December 
1991 and the FIS secured a majority of seats. Justified on the basis of 
“saving” the country from Islamist politics,26 the army generals staged a 
coup d’état the following month, marking the end of Algeria’s  
democratic bout.27 Benjedid was ousted and a provisional governing 
body was erected in lieu of a presidency, the Haut Conseil d’Etat 
(“HCE”), comprised of a quintet of men who were to rule the country 
until Boutiflika’s election in 1999.28 The FIS was banned and a state of 
emergency was declared.29 
Algeria then experienced a gradual descent into chaos. One of the  
historic leaders of the FLN and the then chairman of the HCE,  
Mohammed Boudiaf, was shot dead by one of his bodyguards during a 
speech.30 Armed Islamist factions drawing from the FIS’s support base 
soon emerged and carried out guerilla attacks. The army, then,  
employing “torture, humiliations and deadly reprisals,” not only sought 
to uproot the fighters, but also embarked on a “policy of terror against 
the people to dissuade them from supporting the armed struggle 
groups.”31 The actions of security forces provoked increasing anger 
                                                                                                             
this Note, it should be emphasized that there were various and complex factors,  
especially socio-economic, contributing to the party’s success. For an account of the Dir-
ty War and its roots, see LUIS MARTINEZ, THE ALGERIAN CIVIL WAR: 1990–1998 (Jona-
than Derrick trans., Colum. U. Press 2000). 
 25. STORA, supra note 11, at 209. 
 26. See, e.g., The Junta in Court, Algeria-Watch, Sept. 2002, http://www.algeria-
watch.org/en/aw/junta_court.htm. 
 27. The legitimacy of the overthrow was and remains immensely controversial.  
Debate largely centers upon the relation “between” Islamist politics and democracy, and 
more particularly, the nature of the FIS. For a closer examination of these issues, see for 
example Peter A. Samuelson, Pluralism Betrayed: The Battle Between Secularism and 
Islam in Algeria’s Quest for Democracy, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 309 (1995) (arguing that the 
regime’s coup was unjustified, the threat of the FIS overestimated, and the takeover 
worse than honoring the majority election results). 
 28. On the composition of the HCE, see for example WILLIS, supra note 22, at  
250–52. 
 29. Id. at 256–57. 
 30. The circumstances surrounding his death are both suspicious and contested. It is 
probable that his reluctance to cooperate with the army generals caused his assassination 
by regime insiders. See, e.g., MARTIN EVANS & JOHN PHILLIPS, ALGERIA: ANGER OF THE 
DISPOSSESSED 177–80 (2007); WILLIS, supra note 22, at 263–66; Operation Boudiaf, 
Mouvement Algérien des Officiers Libres, http://www.anp.org/affaireboudiaf/engaff 
boudiaf.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 31. MARTINEZ, supra note 24, at 21–22. 
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among certain FIS sympathizers, who until 1993 had remained passive.32 
While this rage spurred Islamist armed forces to mobilize against the  
security forces, it also led to attacks against civilians,33 whom they  
perceived to be against them, as they were not actively championing their 
cause.34 
This abbreviated narration of the opening events of the Dirty War  
illustrates the basic patterns of violence that were to continue at a  
heightened level until the late 1990s, when the scale of the conflict began 
to decrease. Numerous massacres took place.35 Bomb attacks, often in 
public places, were frequent. In addition to security forces victimizing 
women, including by rape,36 opposition groups raped and abducted 
women,37 sometimes torturing them and sometimes murdering them.38 
Security forces joined by state-armed militias and Islamist groups killed 
each other and civilians alike.39 It is estimated that tens of thousands of 
people were tortured at the hands of state security forces40 after the  
practice became institutionalized in the early 1990s, mostly taking place 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. at 48, 60–61. 
 33. STORA, supra note 11, at 214. 
 34. MARTINEZ, supra note 24, at 72, 76–77. 
 35. There are serious concerns that the state security forces were behind the massa-
cres. HABIB SOUAÏDIA, LA SALE GUERRE: LE TÉMOIGNAGE D’UN ANCIEN OFFICIER DES 
FORCES DE L’ARMÉE ALGÉRIENNE 88–90 (Découverte 2001). See also, e.g., NESROULAH 
YOUS, QUI A TUÉ À BENTALHA?: CHRONIQUE D’UN MASSACRE ANNONCÉ (Découverte 
2000). For an overview of both of these books as well as an appraisal of the credibility of 
their accounts, see HUGH ROBERTS, FRANCE AND THE LOST HONOUR OF ALGERIA’S ARMY, 
reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 305, 
309-13 (Verso) (2003). See also, generally, AN INQUIRY INTO THE ALGERIAN MASSACRES 
(Youcef Bedjaoui, Abbas Aroua, & Meziane Aït-Larbi eds., Hoggar 1999), available at 
http://www.hoggar.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=102&Itemid=3&
limit=1&limitstart=2 (providing a history of and perspectives on the massacres). 
 36. E.g., Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1995, Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/MIDEAST-01.htm#P137_26320 (last visited  
Mar. 12, 2008). 
 37. For an exploration of women and gender identity in Algerian history and society 
from pre-colonial times to the present, see generally MARNIA LAZREG, THE ELOQUENCE 
OF SILENCE: ALGERIAN WOMEN IN QUESTION (1994). 
 38. E.g., Algeria: Fear and Silence: A Hidden Human Rights Crisis, Amnesty Inter-
national, Nov. 19, 1996, at 32, http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE28011 
1996ENGLISH/$File/MDE2801196.pdf [hereinafter Fear and Silence]. 
 39. E.g., Extrajudicial Killings, Algeria-Watch, Apr. 1999, http://www.algeria-
watch.org/en/aw/extrajudicial_killings.htm. 
 40. E.g., January 1992–January 2007: Fifteen Years of Atrocities and Impunity in 
Algeria, Algeria-Watch, Jan. 11, 2007, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/15_years.htm 
[hereinafter Fifteen Years of Atrocities]. 
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at secret detention sites.41 Between 1992 and 1998 alone, state security 
forces disappeared approximately 7000 Algerians.42 
C. Attempts at National “Reconciliation”: 1999–2008 
Efforts responding to the violence have not been limited to the Charter. 
In January 1995, under the auspices of the Sant’Edigio Community in 
Rome, six key opposition parties, including the FIS, signed the Platform 
for a Peaceful Resolution of Algeria’s Crisis, an agreement the Algerian 
government vehemently rejected.43 In February 1995, however, the state 
adopted a clemency law, Qānūn al-rahma, “aimed at repentant  
terrorists.” 44 An estimated 250 to 300 militants took advantage.45 The 
                                                                                                             
 41. E.g., Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 41. The most frequent torture techniques 
include:  
[T]he ‘chiffon’ method (the detainee is tied in a horizontal position to 
a bench and cloth is inserted in his mouth, then his nose is held 
closed and a mixture of dirty water and chemicals is poured in his 
mouth in large quantities causing choking and swelling of the  
stomach); the ‘chalumeau’ (blowtorch, which is used to burn the face 
and parts of the detainee’s body); electric shocks applied to the ears, 
genitals, anus and other sensitive parts of the detainee’s body; tying a 
rope around the detainee’s penis and/or testicles causing swelling of 
the genitals; and beatings all over the body, especially on the  
sensitive parts. Others methods reported are burnings on the body 
with cigarettes; insertion of bottles, sticks and other objects,  
including firearms, in the anus; putting glue in the detainee’s anus; 
placing the detainee’s penis in open drawers and shutting the drawer; 
and suspending the detainee in contorted positions. 
Id. at 44. Additional forms of torture involve castration, amputating fingers, and gauging 
out eyes with forks and knives. La République Torture, Movement Algérien des Officiers 
Libres, http://www.anp.org/frenindex/torture.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 42. This is the highest number of known disappearances in any state during or  
subsequent to this timeframe, second only to Bosnia. Time for Reckoning: Enforced  
Disappearances and Abductions in Algeria, Human Rights Watch (2003) at 3, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria0203/algeria0203.pdf [hereinafter Time for 
Reckoning]. Algeria-Watch puts forth the figure of 20,000 disappeared between January 
1992 and January 2007. Fifteen Years of Atrocities, supra note 40. 
 43. HUGH ROBERTS, ALGERIA’S RUINOUS IMPASSE AND THE HONOURABLE WAY OUT, 
reprinted in THE BATTLEFIELD ALGERIA 1988–2002: STUDIES IN A BROKEN POLITY 160, 
171–75 (Verso) (2003) (elaborating upon the significance of the agreement). 
 44. Among other measures, the law prohibited prosecution for individuals who  
belonged to certain groups and did not perpetrate offenses “leading to loss of human life, 
permanent disability, breach of the moral or physical integrity of citizens or destruction 
of public property.” U.N. Committee Against Torture, Second Periodic Reports of States 
Parties Due in 1994: Algeria, para. 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/25/Add.8 (May 30, 1996) [he-
reinafter CAT Report]. 
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Ministry of the Interior declared in August 1998 that offices were being 
opened in each wilāya46 to process complaints of disappearances,47 which 
the National Human Rights Observatory, set up in February 1992,48 
oversaw. In March 2001, this body was replaced with the ad hoc  
National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights,49 charged with handling the issue of the disappeared.50 
Based on the commission’s report completed four years later, though 
never released, the human rights commissioner admitted that state  
security forces disappeared 6146 people.51 In July 1999, three months 
after becoming president, Boutiflika introduced the “Law of Civil  
Harmony.”52 After being passed by Parliament, this initiative allegedly 
received broad backing in a referendum,53 but it was widely criticized in 
                                                                                                             
 45. Tobias Schumacher, The EU and Algeria: A Forgotten Case?, EuroMeSCo  
Research Seminar “Democratization and Human Rights,” July/Aug. 2006, at 3, 
http://www.euromesco.net/images/enews_9_en.pdf. 
 46. Wilāya is the Algerian-Arabic word for “state,” of which there are forty-eight in 
the country. 
 47. Time for Reckoning, supra note 42, at 40. “Questions were quickly raised about 
this initiative, first because these bureaus were part of the same ministry whose forces 
were suspected in many of the ‘disappearances,’ and second because their working  
methods and powers to collect information were never made public.” Id. 
 48. CAT Report, supra at 44, para. 34. 
 49. Executive decree No. 03-299 (11 Sept. 2003) art. 3 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel  
n° 03-299 du 14 Rajab 1424 correspondant au 11 septembre 2003 complétant le décret 
présidentiel n° 01-71 du 30 Dhou El Hidja 1421 correspondant au 25 mars 2001 portant 
création de la commission nationale consultative de promotion et de protection des droits 
de l’Homme (CNCPPDH).” 
 50. Id. 
 51. “Reconciliation” at the Price of Truth and Justice?, Algeria Watch, Aug. 26, 
2005, http://www.algeria-watch.org/en/aw/truth_justice.htm. Associations for families of 
the disappeared, however, maintain that they have more than 8000 files documenting 
disappearances. Chronology (Part Two), Algeria-Watch, Sept. 10, 2006, http://www. 
algeria-watch.org/en/policy/chronology_2.htm. 
 52. The stated purpose was “to se[t] up . . . particular measures aimed at offering 
suitable solutions for those persons involved in acts of terrorism and subversion.”  
Law of Civil Harmony, Website of International Humanitarian Law, July 13, 1999, 
http://www.wihl.nl/finals/Algeria/AL.LIM.LAW%20OF%20CIVIL%20HARMONY.199
9.pdf. 
 53. Algeria: Attacks on Justice 2000, International Commission of Jurists, Aug. 13, 
2001, http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=2549&lang=en [hereinafter Attacks on 
Justice 2000]. Reduced sentences were allowed for persons who did not commit  
massacres or bomb public places. Granting the option of creating special Probation 
Committees in each wilāya to decide applications for probation, the law permitted this 
relief to those who neither committed or participated in the aforementioned crimes, nor 
those “that have led to the death of people” or involved rape. Exoneration from  
prosecution was afforded to the same class of persons as probation, except the additional 
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public opinion, the press, as well as by secular political movements.54 
According to government figures, approximately 5500 persons  
surrendered.55 And building upon the Law of Civil Harmony, in January 
2000, Boutiflika extended a general amnesty56 to members of two Islam-
ist groups,57 but its precise terms were not revealed.58 
The Charter is thus the most recent in a series of attempts at securing 
lasting peace. Although a Draft Charter was revealed on August 15, 
2005,59 the actual Charter was not disclosed prior to its adoption.60 The 
                                                                                                             
bar of “permanent disabling of a person” was included. This law did not apply to state 
security forces. Law of Civil Harmony, supra note 52, art. 1–3, 7, 11–17, 27. 
 54. These forces “led a campaign against this law arguing that it constituted an  
arbitrary impunity procedure for the abuses and crimes committed and a voluntary silence 
regarding the conditions in which terrorism and repression developed and ceased.”  
Hidouci, infra note 287, at 3. See also, e.g., EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 267 
(“[Grassroots civilian pressure groups] wanted to express their pain and anger and  
believed that, in denying truth and justice, Bouteflika’s transition process was  
fundamentally flawed.”). A domestic opinion poll also suggested that less than half the 
population supported the law. Id. at 270. 
 55. Algeria: Attacks on Justice 2002, International Commission of Jurists, Aug. 26, 
2002, http://www.icj.org/news.php3?id_article=2648&lang=en [hereinafter Attacks on 
Justice 2002]. Even though the Law of Civil Harmony appeared specific enough to  
further reconciliation, there have been criticisms that it was applied arbitrarily and  
without meaningful investigation, thereby largely undermining its supposed value. See, 
e.g., Attacks on Justice 2000, supra note 53; Truth and Justice on Hold: The New State 
Commission on ‘Disappearances, Human Rights Watch, Dec. 2003, at 8, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/algeria1203/algeria1203.pdf. More importantly, this 
amnesty violated international law for the same reasons that the Charter is legally invalid. 
See infra Part II, III. But see Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Scope and Effect of the Algerian 
Law Relating to the Reestablishment of Civil Concord, 13 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 681, 688 
(2000). While violence by armed groups noticeably lowered in the beginning of 2000, it 
swelled at the year’s end, for example, leaving 250 dead in the month of October. EVANS 
& PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 265. 
 56. Executive decree No. 2000-03 (10 Jan. 2000) art. 3 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel  
n° 2000-03 du 4 Chaoual 1420 correspondant au 10 janvier 2000 portant grâce  
amnistiante.” 
 57. Algeria, New Amnesty Law Will Ensure Atrocities Go Unpunished: Muzzles  
Discussion of Civil Conflict: Joint Statement by Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and the International  
Federation of Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2006, http://hrw.org/ 
english/docs/2006/03/01/algeri12743.htm [hereinafter Atrocities Go Unpunished]. 
 58. Attacks on Justice 2000, supra note 53. Killings by armed groups escalated by 
20% in 2000 relative to the prior year. Attacks on Justice 2002, supra note 55. 
 59. Executive decree No. 05-278 (14 Aug. 2005) Annex (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel 
n° 05-278 du 9 Rajab 1426 correspondant au 14 août 2005 portant convocation du corps 
électoral pour le référendum du jeudi 29 septembre 2005 relatif à la réconciliation  
nationale.” For an English translation of the Draft Charter, see Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs, Embassy of Algeria, London, Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, 
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former does not explicitly provide for the amnestying of security forces 
and does not mention the jail sentences and fines that are to be imposed 
for voicing criticism concerning the handling of the “National  
Tragedy.”61 Nevertheless, forty-five days later, Boutiflika’s initiative was 
put to a referendum on September 29, 2005. According to official  
figures, 97.36% of the Algerian populace approved the Charter,62 with an 
average voter turnout of 79.76%63 among approximately 18.3 million 
registered voters.64 There was no independent monitoring of the voting.65 
Algeria’s full cabinet approved the final version on February 27, 2006, 
but Parliament was not in session and did not debate the Charter.66 
Among its most important provisions, the Charter extends amnesty to 
persons who did not commit or participate in massacres, public  
bombings, and rape.67 Those who have already been imprisoned and  
                                                                                                             
http://www.algerianembassy.org.uk/charter_for_peace_and_national_r.htm (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Draft Charter]. 
 60. Joint NGO Letter on the Occasion of the EU-Algeria Association Council on  
20–21st March 2006: Human Rights Concerns at the EU-Algeria Association Council, 
Human Rights Watch, Mar. 14, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/03/14/algeri130 
24.htm. 
 61. Compare Draft Charter, supra note 59, with Charte pour la paix, infra note 67,  
art. 45. 
 62. The deceptively simple question posed to voters was, “Do you agree with the 
Draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which is proposed to you?”  
Executive decree No. 05-278 (14 Aug. 2005) art. 2 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel n° 05-278 
du 9 Rajab 1426 correspondant au 14 août 2005 portant convocation du corps électoral 
pour le référendum du jeudi 29 septembre 2005 relatif à la réconciliation nationale.”  
(author’s translation). 
 63. Some areas called for a boycott of the referendum, and the reported voter turnout 
in the capital was 32% lower than its usual levels. See Algerians Overwhelmingly OK 
National Peace Charter, ARAB NEWS, Oct. 1, 2005, http://www.arabnews.com. 
 64. Algeria Today: Algerians Voted Massively for a Peaceful Future, Embassy of the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, Washington, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1, http://www. 
algeria-us.org/ALGERIA%20TODAY/ALGERIA_TODAY%20SEP%2032%202005.pdf 
[hereinafter Algeria Today]. 
 65. Michael Slackman, Algerian Voters Said to Approve President’s Postwar Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005. 
 66. Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra note 57. 
 67. Legislative decree No. 06-01 (27 Feb. 2006) art. 5–6, 10 (Alg.). “Ordonnance  
n° 06-01 du 28 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 27 février 2006 portant mise en œuvre 
de la Charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale” [hereinafter Charte pour la paix]. 
Given Algeria’s history with prosecutions and its judiciary troubles, it is extremely un-
likely the state will meaningfully prosecute these crimes in the near future. To date, Alge-
ria has failed to offer substantial evidence of prosecutions for any gross human rights 
violations. See, e.g., HRC Observations finales, infra note 114, para 7. 
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sentenced and who did not engage in the aforementioned crimes are  
pardoned.68 Articles 45 and 46 provide: 
No legal proceedings may be initiated against an individual or 
a collective entity, belonging to any component whatsoever of 
the defense and security forces of the Republic, for actions 
conducted for the purpose of protecting persons and property, 
safeguarding the nation or preserving the institutions of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. The competent 
judicial authorities are to summarily dismiss all accusations or 
complaints.69 
Anyone who, by speech, writing, or any other act, uses or  
exploits the wounds of the National Tragedy to harm the  
institutions of the Democratic and Popular Republic of  
Algeria, to weaken the state, or to undermine the good  
reputation of its agents who honorably served it, or to tarnish 
the image of Algeria internationally, shall be punished by 
three to five years in prison and a fine of 250,000 to 500,000 
dinars.70 
In two separate decrees published alongside the Charter, under  
specified measures, the Algerian State offers compensation to the  
“victims of the national tragedy,” including the families of those who 
                                                                                                             
 68. Charte pour la paix, supra note 67, art. 8–10. 
 69. Id. art. 45. The translation of this article is from Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra 
note 57. Implicitly, this provision tracks the non-amnestied crimes for members of armed 
groups. It would be absurd to argue that massacres, public bombings, or rapes were 
committed for “the purpose of protecting persons or property, [or] safeguarding the  
nation.” (Although rape can be a form of torture, it is not “typically” justified on the basis 
of extracting information.) In contrast, according to warfare tactics, it is logically  
consistent, albeit unsound, to maintain that state forces tortured, disappeared, and  
murdered people in furtherance of this specified end. Apparently, the state carefully 
worded this article to allow room for such interpretation. The Human Rights Committee 
criticized this ambiguity when it considered the Charter and implored the state to amend 
it. See HRC Observations finales, infra note 114. See also CAT Observations finales, 
infra note 100. 
 70. Charte pour la paix, supra note note 67, art. 46. The translation used can  
be found at Atrocities Go Unpunished, supra note 57. This fine is approximately  
$3812–$7625 USD as of October 6, 2007. The 2007 Algerian per capita GDP was  
estimated to be $8100. Algeria Country Profile, CIA World Fact Book, available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ag.html (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Algeria Country Profile]. The Human Rights Committee has 
called for the abrogation of this provision. HRC Observations finales, infra note 114,  
para. 8. See also CAT Observations finales, infra note 100, para. 17 (noting that the  
Algerian state “should amend” article 46 in order to ensure an “effective remedy”)  
(author’s translation). 
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have been disappeared,71 as well as those who have participated in  
“terrorism.”72 
II. ALGERIA’S TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
Given the history of the Dirty War, the systematic human rights  
violations that the amnesty law shields are torture, extrajudicial  
executions, and disappearances. Under humanitarian treaties, the  
Charter’s amnestying of these crimes is not invalidated, as a perverse 
result of Algeria’s conflict having been internal. On the other hand, each 
of the multilateral and regional human rights treaties Algeria has  
ratified73 undermines the legal soundness of the Charter with regard to 
the duty to prosecute. 
A. The Geneva Conventions and Common Article 3 
How Common Article 3 relates to “grave breaches” under the Geneva 
Conventions is crucial, as this article explicitly addresses internal armed 
conflicts.74 The distinction between international and internal conflicts in 
                                                                                                             
 71. Executive decree No. 06-93 (28 Feb. 2006) art. 1–2 (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel  
n° 06-93 du 29 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 28 février 2006 relatif à 
l’indemnisation des victimes de la tragédie nationale.” The Algerian state has conditioned 
this indemnification upon families declaring the death of their disappeared loved one. 
Charte pour la paix, supra note note 67, art. 30. Troubled by this requirement, the Human 
Rights Committee has recommended its abolishment. HRC Observations finales, infra 
note 114, para. 13. See also CAT Observations finales, infra note 100, para. 13 (calling 
for the removal of this stipulation and asserting that it constitutes “a form of inhumane 
and degrading treatment”) (author’s translation).  
 72. Executive decree No. 06-94 (28 Feb. 2006) (Alg.). “Décret présidentiel n° 06-94 
du 29 Moharram 1427 correspondant au 28 février 2006 relatif à l’aide de l’Etat aux  
familles démunies éprouvées par l’implication d’un de leurs proches dans le terrorisme.” 
 73. Algeria entered a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with the European Community, 
which went into force in September 2005. EUROPA, European Commission, External 
Relations, Treaties Office, Association Agreements, The Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship, Algeria, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/trea 
tiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=821 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). 
While this agreement contains a provision on human rights, it is very general and  
therefore does not warrant much discussion. See Euro-Mediterranean Agreement  
Establishing an Association between the European Community and its Member States, of 
the One Part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the Other Part, art. 2, 
Oct. 10, 2005, O.J.E.U. L265/2 (2005). 
 74. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31  
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
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humanitarian law has serious repercussions, as the duties and rights  
following from each may not be equal.75 Scholars have long been critical 
of this division, arguing that it has not only become unwieldy particularly 
for “internationalized” armed conflicts,76 but also frustrated the very  
justice this body of law was meant to advance.77 States have a duty to 
extradite or prosecute instances of grave breaches defined in the Geneva 
Conventions, however it is not expressly provided for in internal  
conflicts. 
The prevailing opinion maintains that the aut dedere aut judicare78  
obligation for grave breaches only applies to international conflicts.79 
Nevertheless, at least one scholar has demonstrated how internal  
conflicts can be consistently subsumed within the grave breaches  
regime.80 Even if this regime applies only to international conflicts, there 
                                                                                                             
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
 75. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International  
Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps and Ambiguities, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 199, 223–24 (1998). 
 76. See James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in  
International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313 (2003). 
 77. See Bassiouni, supra note 75, at 224. 
 78. Latin for “extradite or prosecute.” 
 79. ANDREAS O’SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
143–44 (2002). One key argument supporting this view relies upon common article 2 to 
the Geneva Conventions, which states: “[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases 
of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties.” Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 2; Geneva  
Convention II, supra note 74, art. 2; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 2;  
Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 2. As the extradite or prosecute duty belongs 
to the “present Convention[s],” article 2 limits this obligation to international conflicts, 
“between two or more High Contracting Parties.” See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, New 
International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 341 (1998). In addition, as neither 
common article 3 nor Protocol II mentions penal sanctions, it is maintained that their 
application to internal conflicts is excluded. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 144–45  
(summarizing the arguments typically given for the non-applicability of the grave 
breaches regime to internal conflicts). 
 80. In each of the Geneva Conventions, the provisions establishing the duty to  
extradite or prosecute refer to “any of the grave breaches of the present Convention.” 
Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 74,  
at art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra 
note 74, art. 146. The inclusion of the wording, “the present Convention,” suggests the 
aut dedere aut judicare provision applies to the entire treaty, which contains article 3 
treating internal conflicts. The articles defining grave breaches that directly follow those 
establishing this duty verify that they are “defining the nature of breaches of the other 
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is a growing trend to blur the division between international and internal 
conflicts and apply certain rules of war to the latter.81 In the meantime, 
the aut dedere aut judicare duty does not reach amnesty laws such as 
Algeria’s. Like countless other states, if Algeria can be considered  
fortunate not to have had its war further complicated by outside state  
actors, it is tragically ironic that the consequences of this  
non-involvement under the Geneva Conventions means the difference 
between furthering accountability and allowing for impunity. 
B. Protocol II 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts  
(“Protocol II”)82 not only governs Algeria’s Dirty War, but also directly 
addresses amnesties in article 6(5). Ostensibly, this provision seems  
troublesome for a duty to prosecute: 
                                                                                                             
articles . . . rather than giving a complete definition of the norms that might be breached.” 
O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 146. They provide: “Grave breaches to which the preceding 
Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts.” Geneva Convention I, 
supra note 74, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 74, art. 51; Geneva Convention 
III, supra note 74, art. 130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 74, art. 147. It is further 
argued that this reading is bolstered by the travaux préparatoires and succeeding  
practice, demonstrating a purpose not to exclude internal conflicts from the grave breach-
es regime. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 147–51. 
  Given the general consensus supporting the former analysis, a reading to the  
contrary might seem superfluous at this point: Internal armed conflicts have “lost the 
battle” for inclusion in the grave breaches regime! Nonetheless, it is important to recall 
that the Trial and Appellate Chambers in Tadic differed when considering whether article 
2 of the ICTY statute, which encompassed grave breaches under the Geneva  
Conventions, covered non-international conflicts. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 
IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 50 (Aug. 10, 1995), with 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 78 (Oct. 2, 1995) (noting, however, that “contrary to the 
drafters’ apparent indifference to the nature of the underlying conflicts, such an interpre-
tation would authorize the International Tribunal to prosecute and punish certain conduct 
in an international armed conflict, while turning a blind eye to the very same conduct in 
an internal armed conflict.”) In a separate opinion, Judge Abi-Saab agreed with the Trial 
Chamber, finding no international conflict requirement to article 2 of the ICTY statute. 
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the 
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, sec. 4 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
 81. See Bassiouni, supra note 75, at 224; Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The 
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist 
View, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 312–13 (1999); Stewart, supra note 76, at 344. 
 82. Algeria ratified this instrument in August 1989. Secretary General, Status of the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/53/287 (Aug. 26, 1998). 
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At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant 
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the 
armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to 
the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.83 
While there have been a handful of decisions treating this article as 
sanctioning amnesty laws following a civil conflict,84 this position is  
dubious. Structurally, the provision on amnesty is nestled at the bottom 
of a section devoted to penal prosecutions.85 In keeping with this  
observation, the International Committee of the Red Cross offered: 
The ‘travaux preparatoires’ of [article] 6(5) indicate that this 
provision aims at encouraging amnesty, i.e., a sort of release at 
the end of hostilities, for those detained or punished for the 
mere fact of having participated in hostilities. It does not  
aim at an amnesty for those having violated international  
humanitarian law.86 
The sounder interpretation, therefore, is that Protocol II considers the 
permissibility of amnesty for general criminal sanctions after civil strife, 
not for serious violations of humanitarian law.87 
C. Convention Against Torture 
There is a very strong basis for finding that the Charter breaches the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
                                                                                                             
 83. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 
1977, art. 6(5), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–2, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
 84. The most prominent example is the AZAPO case analyzing the validity of South 
Africa’s amnesty law. Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the  
Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.). At least one  
commentator has argued that this interpretation is sound based on the plenary meeting 
notes for Protocol II. See Karen Gallagher, Note, No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities 
and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 176–78 (2000). 
 85. This implies that “the drafters were primarily interested in reintegrating insurgents 
into national life.” Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the 
Way Forward, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 93, 97 (1996). 
 86. Letter from Dr. Toni Pfanner, Head of the Legal Division, ICRC Geneva, to The 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 15, 
1997, cited in Douglass Cassel, Accountability for International Crime and Serious  
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for 
International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197, 218 
(1996). 
 87. See, e.g. Cassel, supra note 86.  
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Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”)88 to the extent that it precludes  
Algeria’s obligation89 to prosecute those among the security forces and 
state-militias who carried out acts of torture.90 Article 7 sets forth that a 
state party “shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if it does not  
extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose 
of prosecution.”91 
Some scholars have read this provision as “not explicitly requir[ing] 
that a prosecution take place, let alone that punishment be imposed and 
served,” article 7 only specifying that the state party must “submit the 
case.”92 This particular wording may have been chosen, though, in order 
to “respect the independence of national courts and the procedural rights 
of defendants by avoiding language that suggested that a particular  
outcome of prosecutions was required.”93 Similarly, it has further been 
noted that the aut dedere aut judicare obligation is also included in such 
fundamental conventions94 as the Convention on the Prevention and  
                                                                                                             
 88. Algerian ratified CAT on October 10, 1989. Office of the U.N. High  
Commissioner for Human Rights, Algeria’s Homepage, Status of Ratifications, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatusbycountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=25
0&Expand=3#3 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008) [hereinafter UNHCHR Algeria]. 
 89. For a well-informed overview of approaches under Islamic law to the 
(im)permissibility of torture, see Sadiq Reza, Torture and Islamic Law, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
21 (2007) (calling into doubt a relation between Islamic law and the practice of torture in 
“Muslim-majority countries”). 
 90. CAT’s definition of “torture” restricts the scope of the Convention’s application 
to Algerian security forces and state-armed civil militias. See Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 
art.1(1), U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [he-
reinafter CAT]. 
 91. Id. art. 7. 
 92. Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2604 (1991). See also Leila Nadya 
Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1020 (2006) 
(noting CAT is “unclear” regarding scope of duty to prosecute, “leav[ing] a certain  
degree of discretion to national legal systems in [its] implementation”). 
 93. Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2604, n.306. See also Michael Scharf,  
Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human 
Rights: The Letter of Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute 
Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 41, 46–47 (1997) (Such language was 
intended “to reflect the developments in international standards of due process that had 
occurred in the nearly forty years since the Genocide Convention was drafted in 1948.”). 
 94. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute 
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 451, 463–66 
(1990). 
992 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,95 and the Geneva Conventions.96 
Seventeen additional international treaties feature this provision, many of 
which deal with terrorism.97 
A recent Preliminary Report before the General Assembly offers a  
current interpretation of CAT’s aut dedere aut judicare provision: 
It seems that the existing treaty practice . . . has already created a  
sufficient basis for considering the extent to which the obligation to  
extradite or prosecute, so important as a matter of international criminal 
policy, has become a matter of concrete legal obligation . . . [S]everal 
treaties (for example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) compel [s]tates  
parties to introduce rules to enforce the aut dedere aut judicare  
principle, according to which the State which does not order extradition 
is obliged to prosecute . . . . States will therefore have to set up  
appropriate mechanisms to ensure the effective enforcement of this 
principle.98 
This statement suggests that whether or not a conviction and sentence 
is ultimately imposed, “submit[ting] the case to [a state party’s]  
competent authorities” in accordance with article 7 means that at  
minimum a prosecution must be brought. And fittingly, according to a 
general comment the Committee Against Torture recently issued: 
“[A]mnesties or other impediments which preclude or indicate  
unwillingness to provide prompt and fair prosecution and punishment of 
perpetrators of torture or ill-treatment violate the principle of  
non-derogability.”99  
                                                                                                             
 95. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 96. Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 
74, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 74, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra 
note 74, art. 146. 
 97. This has led one scholar to observe that “the purpose of the principle is to ensure 
that those who commit crimes under international law are not granted safe haven  
anywhere in the world.” Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 463–66. For a complete list of 
these treaties, see Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty to Enact and Enforce Jurisdiction, 
Amnesty International, (2001) at 21, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/IOR530182001 
ENGLISH/$File/IOR5301801.pdf. A recent overview of the issues involved in the aut 
dedere aut judicare principle can be found at Report of the Int’l Law Commission, 394–
99, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). 
 98. Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Commission, Preliminary Report on the Obligation 
to Extradite or Prosecute (“Aut Dedere Aut Judicare”), para. 38–39, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/571 (June 7, 2006) (prepared by Zdzislaw Galicki) 
[hereinafter Extradite or Prosecute Report]. 
     99.  U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of  
Article 2 by State Parties, para. 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (2008).   
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The committee invoked this declaration in its May 2008 concluding 
observations on Algeria’s compliance with CAT.100 Offering strong  
criticisms, the Committee Against Torture observed that the Charter’s 
provisions amnestying armed groups and state forces “do not conform to 
the obligation of every state party . . . to pursue the authors of [torture] . . 
. .”101 After instructing the Algerian state to amend the Charter to clarify 
that it does not amnesty acts of torture,102 the committee asserted: “The 
state party should take without delay all necessary measures to guarantee 
that . . . the authors of [torture, past or recent, including rape and forced 
disappearances] are pursued and punished in a manner proportionate to 
the gravity of acts committed . . . .”103 CAT therefore grounds a clear 
duty to prosecute perpetrators of torture, which amnesty laws like  
Algeria’s transgress.   
D. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
(“International Covenant”),104 an effective remedy imposes duties upon 
the Algerian state that conflict with the Charter. This fundamental  
instrument establishes a states party’s commitment to “respect” and  
“ensure” certain rights105 as well as provide an “effective remedy” when 
these rights are violated, “notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”106 Emphasis has 
been placed on the drafting history, which has been argued to express the 
need for “ensuring accountability of government authorities for  
violations, especially by ruling out the defenses of sovereign immunity 
or following superior orders,” a purpose explicitly shown, for example, 
in the above quoted clause.107 
                                                                                                             
 100. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Examen des Rapports Présentés par les États  
Parties en Application de l’Article 19 de la Convention, Observations finales du Comité 
contre la torture, Version Non Editee, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DZA/CO/3 (2008) 
[hereinafter CAT Observations finales].  
 101. Id. para. 11 (author’s translation).  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. (author’s translation). 
 104. In December 1989, Algeria became a state party to the International Covenant as 
well as the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
UNHCHR Algeria, supra note 88. 
 105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) art. 
2(1), 21st Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)  
[hereinafter International Covenant]. 
 106. Id. art. 2(3)(a). 
 107. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 475–76. 
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Legal scholars have pointed to numerous decisions by the Human 
Rights Committee (“HRC”) interpreting the right to an effective remedy 
as requiring a state’s duty to investigate and prosecute breaches,108  
particularly those involving torture and disappearances.109 Key decisions 
date back as early as the mid-1980s.110 While it is accurate that in earlier 
communications the committee acted more to encourage than assert a 
duty to prosecute, leaving some discretion to the state,111 the language it 
has employed has remarkably strengthened over the years to support an 
unambiguous obligation. For example, in the case of Algeria alone, the 
HRC has issued no fewer than six communications concerning torture 
and disappearances that expressly declare that the Algerian state has a 
duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators.112 
                                                                                                             
 108. Although the International Covenant provides for derogation “in time of public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,” it is not permitted for “articles 6, 7, 8 
(paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18.” International Covenant, supra note 105,  
art. 4(1)–(2). A state party may derogate from neither the prohibition on torture contained 
in article 7, nor articles 6 and 16, which respectively ground the right not to be  
disappeared or extrajudicially killed. Id. art. 6, 16. The derivative rights of nonderogable 
provisions that follow from article 2(3) are likewise nondergogable, even though this 
provision is not expressly mentioned in article 4. See U.N. Human Rights Comm.,  
General Comment No. 29, State of Emergency (Article 4), para. 14, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001). 
 109. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2569–71; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94,  
at 477–78. 
 110. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication  
No. 107/1981, para. 15–16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2/107/1981 (1990); U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. 30/1978, para. 13(3), 15, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1/30/1978 (1985); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Muteba v. Zaire, 
Communication No. 124/1982, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/39/40/124/1982 (1984). These 
communications did not involve discussion of amnesty laws. Nonetheless, in Rodriguez 
v. Uruguay, considering Uruguay’s amnesty law, the HRC stated that “amnesties for 
gross violations of human rights and legislation such as . . . [its] Ley de Caducidad de la 
Pretension Punitiva del Estado are incompatible with the obligations of the State party 
under the Covenant” and “urge[d]” Uruguay to investigate the allegations of torture and 
provide for civil redress as well as compensation. U.N. Human Rights Comm.,  
Rodriguez v. Uruguay, Communications No. 322/1988, para. 12(4), 14 U.N. Doc. CCPR/ 
2/3/A/322/1988 (1994). 
 111. See Scharf, supra note 93, at 48–52. 
 112. The following pronouncement is typical of that contained in each of these  
communications:  
[T]he State party is under an obligation to provide the author with an 
effective remedy, including a thorough and effective investigation in-
to the disappearance and fate of the author’s son, his immediate  
release if he is still alive, adequate information resulting from its  
investigation, and adequate compensation for the author and her  
family for the violations suffered by the author’s son. The State party 
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Consistent with these communications, the committee considered  
Algeria in October 2007113 and picked apart the Charter, stating that the 
Algerian state should: 
Take all appropriate measures to guarantee that grave human rights  
violations brought to its attention, such as massacres, torture, rape, and 
disappearances, are made the object of investigations, and that those  
responsible for such violations, including state agents and members of 
armed groups, are pursued and respond for their acts.114 
Engage in a complete and independent investigation into every  
allegation of disappearance, and after identification, pursue and punish 
the guilty.115 
Guarantee that all allegations of torture and cruel, inhumane and  
degrading treatment are made the object of investigations brought by an 
independent authority and that those responsible for such acts are  
pursued and punished in a consequential manner.116 
In addition, in paragraph 7(a) of its concluding observations, the  
committee asserted: “[A]rticle 45 should be amended in order to clarify 
that crimes such as torture, murder, and abductions are exempt from [its] 
                                                                                                             
is also under a duty to prosecute criminally, try and punish those held 
responsible for such violations. The State party is also under an  
obligation to take measures to prevent similar violations in the future. 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Boucherf v. Algeria, Communication No. 1196/2003,  
para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003 (2006) (emphasis added). See also, U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Aber v. Algeria, Communication No. 1439/2005, para. 9, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1439/2005 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Grioua v. Algeria, 
Communication No. 1327/2004, para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1327/2004 (2007); 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Cheraitia v. Algeria, Communication No. 1328/2004,  
para. 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1328/2004 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,  
Medjnoune v. Algeria, Communication No. 1297/2004, para. 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/87/1297/2004 (2006); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Bousroual v. Algeria, 
Communication No. 992/2001, para. 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/992/2001 (2006). 
 113. The committee probed the state with an extensive list of twenty-seven issues, five 
of which were directly related to the Charter. U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues 
to be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of 
Algeria, para. 3, 13, 22–23, 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DZA/Q/3 (2007). 
 114. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Examen des Rapports Présentés par les États Parties 
Conformément á l’Article 40 du Pacte, Observations finales du Comité des droits de 
l’Homme, Version Non Editee, para. 7(b), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3/CRP.1 (2007) 
(author’s translation) [hereinafter HRC Observations finales]. 
 115. Id. para. 12(d) (author’s translation). 
 116. Id. para. 15(a) (author’s translation). 
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application.”117 Although the HRC’s recommendations were not couched 
in mandatory language, this does not detract from their legal force, as the 
committee’s purpose is not to dictate, but rather to approach states in a 
non-combative manner. These statements concerning the Charter are  
remarkable in both number and degree of specificity. Given the Charter’s 
central purpose to extinguish criminal actions118 as well as the HRC’s 
statement in paragraph 7(a), the above-quoted references to “pursue and 
respond” and “pursue and punish” indicate that perpetrators of gross  
human rights violations are to be held criminally responsible. Thus, in 
accordance with the International Covenant, Algeria, inter alia, must 
prosecute and punish for the crimes it amnesties, namely, torture,  
extrajudicial murders and disappearances. 
E. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Article 7(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“African Charter”)119 provides that “[e]very individual shall have the 
right to . . . an appeal to competent national organs against acts of  
violating his fundamental rights . . . .”120 Article 5 expressly prohibits 
torture, article 6 establishes a right to liberty and security, and article 26 
                                                                                                             
 117. “Moreover, the State party should make sure to inform the public that article 45 
does not apply to declarations or proceedings for torture, extrajudicial executions, and 
disappearances.” Id. para. 7(a) (author’s translation). 
 118. Within a paragraph on criminal punishments, the HRC noted: “[It] believes that 
[the Charter], which bans all proceedings against units of the defense and security forces, 
also appears to promote impunity and undermine the right to an effective remedy (articles 
2, 6, 7, and 14 of the Covenant).” Id. para. 7 (author’s translation). At first glance, the 
word “appear” may seem at odds with the committee’s strong recommendations.  
However, the Algerian state vaguely referenced having criminally pursued and punished 
perpetrators of abuses. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Summary Record of the 2495th 
Meeting, para. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2495 (2007); U.N. Human Rights Comm., 
Replies of the Government of the Algerian Republic to the List of Issues to be Taken up 
in Connection with Consideration of the Third Periodic Report of Algeria, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/DZA/Q/3/Add.1 (2007) (noting prosecutions and convictions for members of 
“legitimate defense groups,” but for “ordinary offenses”). Moreover, the right to an  
effective remedy also imposes upon states the duty to investigate and disclose pertinent 
information, which the Charter does not explicitly bar. If the committee used “appear” 
instead of simply declaring that the Charter spawns impunity and violates the right to an 
effective remedy, it was only giving the state the benefit of the doubt. 
 119. Algeria became a state party in March 1987. African Union, List of Countries 
Which Have Signed, Ratified / Acceded to the African Union Convention on African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, http://www.achpr.org/english/ratifications/ 
ratification_charter_en.pdf [hereinafter Parties to African Charter]. 
 120. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 7(1), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/ 
67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (June, 27, 1981) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
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sets forth a state’s “duty to guarantee the independence of the Courts . . . 
.”121 With these particular articles in consideration, the African  
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) 
issued a set of Principles and Guidelines (“Guidelines”),122 in which it set 
forth: “The granting of amnesty to absolve perpetrators of human rights 
violations from accountability violates the right of victims to an effective 
remedy.”123 
Prior to the Guidelines, the commission expressed this principle 
against such amnesties in consideration of communications submitted 
against Mauritania.124 The communications involved claims of “grave or 
massive violations of human rights,” including torture and  
disappearances.125 In 1993, the Mauritanian parliament adopted an  
amnesty law covering these violations, a law that the African 
Commission noted: “[H]ad the effect of annulling the penal nature of the 
precise facts and violations . . . [and] leading to the foreclosure of any 
judicial actions . . . .”126 The commission declared that the state “has the 
duty to adjust its legislation to harmonise it with its international  
obligations,”127 which, read with the preceding observation, implies a 
duty to prosecute. Confirming this obligation, the commission instructed 
Mauritania to “identify and bring to book the authors of the violations . . 
. .”128 
Given not only the Guidelines’ pronouncement on the irreconcilability 
of general amnesty laws with the African Charter, but also the African 
Commission’s identification of a duty for Mauritania to reframe its  
amnesty law, the African Charter prohibits amnesty laws for grave  
human rights violations. This forbiddance includes amnestying violations 
of torture and disappearances, as in the case of Mauritania, and  
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. art. 5–6, 26. 
 122. Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa, pmbl., OAU Doc. DOC/OS(XXX)247 (adopted 2001). 
 123. Id. para. C(d). An effective remedy entails “access to justice,” “reparation for the 
harm suffered,” and “access to the factual information concerning the violations.”  
Id. para. C(b). Furthermore, “[e]very State has an obligation to ensure that . . . any  
persons whose rights have been violated, including by persons acting in an official  
capacity, has an effective remedy by a competent judicial body[,]” and a claim to a right 
to a remedy must be “determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative 
authorities.” Id. para. C(c)(1)–(2). 
 124. 13th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 1999–2000, 150, OAU Doc. AHG/222(XXXVI). 
 125. Id. para. 115–14. 
 126. Id. para. 81–82. 
 127. Id. para. 84. 
 128. Id. at 161 (emphasis added). 
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extrajudicial killings,129 all three of which the Charter shields from pros-
ecution. 
III. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
If the legal invalidity of the Charter is established under Algeria’s trea-
ty obligations, academic literature reveals that a duty to prosecute under 
customary international law is highly controversial, scholars  
remaining near evenly split.130 Nevertheless, after examining a wide  
                                                                                                             
 129. See African Charter, supra, note 120, art. 4–7. 
 130. There are those who adopt the position that there is some form of an obligation to 
prosecute under customary international law. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for 
International Crime and Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights: Searching 
for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 9, 17–18 (1996) (asserting that the aut dedere aut judicare provision applies to 
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and torture); Sadat, supra note 92,  
at 1014–22 (suggesting that a custom against amnesties for jus cogens crimes may now 
have come to fruition); Carla Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute? 
5 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 21, 13, 15–16 (1994) (pointing to an emerging norm to prosecute 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and possibly disappearances and extrajudicial 
murders as well, despite “inconclusive” state practice); Orentlicher, supra note 92,  
at 2582–85 (maintaining that a custom requiring punishment of torture, extra-judicial 
killings, and disappearances exists or is budding); O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 228–65 
(arguing that state practice and opinio juris support an obligation to prosecute extra-legal 
killings, genocide, torture, customary crimes, and those crimes under the jurisdiction of 
the ICC); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 489–505 (stating that there is a crystallizing 
duty to investigate and “take action against” grave human rights violations and  
advocating for an obligation to prosecute and investigate); Milena Sterio, Rethinking 
Amnesty, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 391–94 (2006); William W. Burke-White, 
Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an Analysis of  
Amnesty Legislation, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 467, 529–30 (2001) (noting that amnesty laws 
are legally invalid where they encompass war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
and torture). 
  Contrastingly, there is a sizeable group of scholars who maintain that a custom 
requiring prosecution is either lacking and / or too unclear. See Roman Boed, The Effect 
of Domestic Amnesty on the Ability of Foreign States to Prosecute Alleged Perpetrators 
of Serious Human Rights Violations, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 297, 314–18 (2000)  
(concluding that although there is likely sufficient opinio juris, state practice prevents the 
assertion that there is a customary duty to prosecute crimes against humanity); Kristin 
Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 595, 
626–28, 648 (1999) (acknowledging that while “international law does seem to be  
moving the direction of prohibiting the grant of amnesty for international crimes,” if  
certain measures are sufficiently provided for in the context of democratic transition, 
even amnesty provisions covering international crimes might be acceptable); Dwight G. 
Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a  
Distributive Problem, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 293, 306–15 (2005) (holding that despite 
“some trends in the progress of duties to prosecute . . . sources do not support the  
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variety of sources, this section argues that such a duty does in fact exist 
for the gravest of war crimes as well as crimes against humanity. 
A. International Tribunals 
According to the ICTY in the Furundzija case, torture’s jus cogens131 
status has certain consequences, namely, that interstate acknowledgment 
of national amnesty laws that protect perpetrators of torture “would not 
be accorded international legal recognition.”132 This non-recognition is 
based on the inconsistency of maintaining that “treaties or customary 
rules providing for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be 
unmindful of a State say, taking national measures authorising or  
condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty 
law.”133 
In “The Lomé Amnesty Decision,” the SCSL considered whether the 
broad amnesty in the Lomé Agreement barred its jurisdiction over  
international crimes.134 The SCSL found that it did have universal  
jurisdiction based on the reasoning that “a state cannot sweep such 
crimes into oblivion and forgetfulness . . . [as] the obligation to protect 
human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the nature of  
obligation erga omnes.”135 However, the SCSL noted that a custom  
prohibiting amnesty for international crimes “is developing,” rather than 
                                                                                                             
incorporation of a generalized duty”); Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old  
Atrocities, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 726–29 (1999); Scharf, supra note 93, at 52–61 (arguing 
that there is no custom requiring states to refrain from granting amnesty for crimes 
against humanity); Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International 
Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 
43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 191 (2002) (maintaining that “existing international law is vague 
about the specifics of a state’s obligation to prosecute or punish,” but some type of  
accountability is necessary for grave human rights violations); Trumbull, supra note 10, 
at 290–303 (finding no custom legally invalidating amnesty laws, and asserting that even 
though blanket amnesty laws might breach certain obligations, the scope of these  
obligations is uncertain). 
 131. Jus cogens is “[a] mandatory or peremptory norm of general international law 
accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no  
derogation is permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 2004) 
 132. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, para. 155 (Dec. 10, 
1998). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Case No. SCSL-2004-
16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, para 1, 65 
(Mar. 13, 2004). 
 135. Id. para. 69, 71–72. 
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fully formed.136 In the subsequent Kondewa case, contrastingly, Justice 
Robertson addressed the customary status of amnesties at length in a 
separate opinion, concluding that a rule does exist that “invalidates  
amnesties offered under any circumstances to persons most responsible 
for crimes against humanity (genocide and widespread torture) and the 
worst war crimes (namely those in Common Article 3 of the Geneva  
Conventions).”137 
B. Inter-American System 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Inter-American Court”) 
has long been at the forefront in framing the duties of states vis-à-vis 
massive human rights violations. In its seminal case, Valásquez 
Rodríguez, the court interpreted in now famous dicta the “respect” and 
“ensure” language of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(“American Convention”)138 to require states to “prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention.”139 
With countless cases of human rights abuses brought before the  
Inter-American System, amnesty laws have also come into consideration. 
Not only the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights  
(“Inter-American Commission”), but also the Inter-American Court have 
consistently declared the incompatibility of amnesty laws with  
obligations under the American Convention. For example, in ruling on 
Peru’s grant of amnesty to security forces and civilians for human rights 
violations committed between 1980 and 1995, in the Barrios Altos Case, 
the Inter-American Court asserted the following: 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. para. 82. Duties erga omnes have been defined as “obligations of a State  
towards the international community as a whole. By their very nature [they] are the  
concern of all States. In view of the importance of the right involved, all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection.” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Co., Ltd. (Belg. V. Spain), 46 I.L.R. 178, 206 (I.C.J. 1970). 
 137. Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Separate Opinion of 
Justice Robertson on the Decision on Lack of Jurisdiction / Abuse of Process: Amnesty 
Provided by the Lomé Accord, para. 51 (May 25, 2004). Referring to Protocol II, Justice 
Robertson reasoned, its amnesty provision “would apply to rank and file participants, but 
not to authors of [armed] conflicts.” Id. para. 32. Acknowledging the existence of state 
practice undermining a customary rule, Justice Robertson noted that this is at least  
partially offset by “a hand-wringing quality about the excuses for amnesty by states 
which grant them.” Id. para. 47. 
 138. American Convention on Human Rights art. 1, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123 (Nov. 22, 1969) reprinted in OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.12. 
 139. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at para. 166 
(July 29, 1988). 
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All amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and the  
establishment of measures designed to eliminate responsibility are  
inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and 
punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations 
such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution and 
forced disappearance.140 
Likewise, the Inter-American Commission found amnesty laws in  
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador as well as Uruguay to be in violation of the 
American Convention, and reiterated a state’s duty to investigate,  
prosecute and punish. 141 
C. National Courts 
Granting amnesty for acts and omissions “associated with political  
objectives” provided that an applicant fully discloses relevant facts, 
South Africa’s Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 
1995 was reviewed by the Constitutional Court of South Africa (“South 
                                                                                                             
 140. Barrios Altos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at para. 41 (Mar. 14, 
2001). At least one scholar has suggested that this case does not establish a duty to  
prosecute based on the Inter-American Court’s subsequent judgment in the case on  
reparations. See Trumbull, supra note 10, at 301, n.96. It is important to note that Peru 
stated in the initial decision before the Court that it would concede the violation of a right 
to fair trial and judicial guarantees in failing to punish the crimes in question as well as 
consider “the viability of criminal and administrative punishments.” Barrios Altos Case, 
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, at para. 35 (Mar. 14, 2001). Moreover, the  
Inter-American Commission recommended that Peru “punish those responsible for these 
grave crimes, through the corresponding criminal procedure.” Id. para. 17. The Court’s 
judgment on reparations actually does reference a duty to prosecute. With regard to  
non-monetary reparations, the Inter-American Court unanimously ordered the application 
of its judgment on the merits, which expressly set forth an obligation to “punish those 
responsible.” In addition, in its original judgment, the Court found that Peru violated the 
right to fair trial and judicial protection, “as a consequence of the enactment and  
enforcement of [its two amnesty laws].” Barrios Altos Case, Judgement of November 30, 
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, at para. 50(5)(a), 3(2)(c), 3(5) (Nov. 30, 2001). 
And, both amnesty laws were passed in the middle of criminal court proceedings against 
the perpetrators of the massacre in question. Id. para. 2(g)–(m). 
 141. E.g. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309 & 10.311, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R. Report No. 28/92, OEA/ser. L/V/II.82, doc. 24, para. 40–41 (1992); Espinoza v. 
Chile, Case 11.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 133/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 6 
rev. para. 64-67 (1999); Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, 1993 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 
Report No. 26/92, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.83, doc. 14 (1992); Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 
10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, & 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 
Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, para. 46, 50 (1992); Romero y Galdámez, 
Case 11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No. 37/00, OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3, rev. at 
671, para. 4, 126, 129–31, 141, 158–59 (1999). 
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African Court”) in the AZAPO Case.142 This body considered  
international law only for the purposes of interpreting the South African 
Constitution, which contained the Act in question, and deemed  
“irrelevant” any duty to the contrary established by international law.143 
Turning to the Geneva Conventions, the court found that the duty to 
prosecute grave violations therein enshrined was inapplicable based on 
the distinction between international and internal conflicts, South  
Africa’s case belonging to the latter type.144 The court then bolstered this 
presumption by arguably misinterpreting Protocol II as encouraging  
national amnesties.145 And thus, the right to criminal prosecutions was 
swiftly rejected.146 
In contrast, in a 2004 decision, the supreme court of Chile denied the 
application of Chile’s amnesty law to forced disappearances and  
affirmed prison sentences for defendants found guilty of disappearing 
persons in 1975.147 The court relied on the Inter-American Convention of 
Forced Disappearances of Persons, even though this treaty was not  
ratified by the country’s parliament, and unanimously declared that 
forced disappearances constitute a crime against humanity to which no 
statute of limitations applies.148 As the crime of disappearing individuals 
is a continuing violation, the court found that the country’s amnesty law 
shielding crimes perpetrated between 1973 and 1978 was inapplicable.149 
Significantly, what the court did find binding were principles established 
                                                                                                             
 142. Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 143. Id. para. 26. 
 144. Id. para. 29–30. 
 145. Id. para. 30–31. See supra Part II(b). 
 146. For criticism of South Africa’s decision not to prosecute and its Truth and  
Reconciliation Commission, see for example Ziyad Motala, The Use of the Truth  
Commission in South Africa as an Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism Versus the  
International Law Obligations, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 913 (2005). See also, e.g., Oli-
via Lin, Demythologizing Restorative Justice: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts in Context, 12 ISLA J. INT’L & COMP L. 41 
(2005) (questioning the uncompromising acceptance of restorative justice). 
 147. Supreme Court of Chile: Case of Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez (November 
17, 2004), American Society of International Law, International Law in Brief, Oct. 30, 
2004, http://www.asil.org/ilib/2004/11/ilib041119.htm#j2 [hereinafter Rodriguez Case]. 
 148. Id. Chile is not a party to the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/bodies/ratification/6.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 149. Rodriguez Case, supra note 147. 
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by the United Nations International Law Commission and given effect by 
the Nuremberg Tribunal as well as the ICTY.150 
The supreme court of Argentina went even further in its 2005 landmark 
decision that struck down the country’s two amnesty laws as  
unconstitutional.151 The court deemed disappearances a crime against 
humanity with jus cogens status, thereby invalidating any statutory  
limitations.152 Furthermore, even though Argentina ratified the American 
Convention after the amnesty laws, the court established that the amnesty 
laws prevented the state from satisfying its obligations under the treaty as 
well as under established principles of international law, as both the  
purpose and the effect of the amnesty laws were to bar prosecution.153 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court closely drew from the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American Court, particularly the Barrios Altos Case.154 
D. Regional Agreements 
The monitoring bodies of the African Charter and the American  
Convention have interpreted their instruments to establish a duty to pros-
ecute human rights violations155 and both are widely ratified.156 In addi-
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. As of December 2006, Chile has found more than 100 people guilty of crimes 
including disappearances, murders, and torture, and 35 former generals are either  
sentenced or to stand trial. Larry Rohter, Chile’s Leader Attacks Amnesty Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006. 
 151. Supreme Court of Argentina: Case of Julio Héctor Simon (Decision declaring 
Argentina’s Amnesty Laws Unconstitutional) (June 14, 2005), American Society of  
International Law, International Law in Brief, June 28, 2005, available at http://www. 
asil.org/ilib/2005/06/ilib050628.htm. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. In June 2006, the first prosecution of a former official took place since the 
invalidation of the amnesty laws. Two months later, the first conviction was issued; a 
former police officer received twenty-five years for his participation in disappearing a 
couple and their infant daughter. Joe Shaulis, Argentina Ex-President Testifies  
Now-Annulled ‘Dirty War’ Amnesty Laws Needed, JURIST, Aug. 31, 2006, http://jurist. 
law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/argentina-ex-president-testifies-now.php. 
 155. See supra Part II(e), Part III(b). 
 156. All fifty-three members of the African Union have ratified the African Charter. 
Parties to African Charter, supra note 120. Twenty-five states are parties to the American 
Convention. Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American  
System, American Convention, Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications, 
OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev.12 (Jan. 31, 2007). Nine states have yet to ratify this instrument, 
including the United States, but, unlike international treaties, support for human rights 
principles at a regional level does not require near unanimity. See RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW (THIRD): FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c), cmt. 11  
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
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tion, while the European Court of Human Rights has read article 1157 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms158 as grounding a duty to prevent or remedy transgressions of 
the treaty, the European Commission on Human Rights has construed it 
as an obligation to prosecute criminally where suitable.159 
E. U.N. Resolutions and Activities 
In a 1973 General Assembly resolution, the following principle was 
framed in obligatory language: “War crimes and crimes against humanity 
. . . shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there 
is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to  
tracing, arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment.”160 
Resolutions on specific human rights crimes have also framed the duty 
to prosecute and punish in mandatory terms. Regarding extra-judicial 
killings, the Economic and Social Council passed a resolution in 1989 
stating: “[I]n no circumstances, including a state of war, siege or other 
public emergency, shall blanket immunity from prosecution be granted to 
any person allegedly involved in extra-legal, arbitrary or summary  
executions.”161 According to the Declaration on the Protection of All  
Persons from Enforced Disappearances adopted by the General  
Assembly in 1992, alleged perpetrators of disappearances “shall not ben-
efit from any special amnesty law or similar measures that might have 
the effect of exempting them from any criminal proceedings or sanc-
tion.”162 And concerning torture, in a 1999 resolution, the  
Commission on Human Rights declared: “[T]hose who encourage, order, 
                                                                                                             
 157. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  
art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950). 
 158. There are forty-six parties to this instrument. European Court of Human Rights, 
Basic Texts, Dates of Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Additional Protocols, http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Oct. 18, 2007). 
 159. Yasmin Naqvi, Amnesty for War Crimes: Defining the Limits of International 
Recognition, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 583, 607 (2003). 
 160. Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 
3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78 para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9030 
(1973) (adopted with ninety-four in favor, none against, and twenty-nine abstentions) 
[hereinafter Principles of International Co-operation]. 
 161. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council Res. 1989/65, para. 19, U.N. 
ESCOR Supp. No. 1 at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (May 24, 1989). 
 162. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. 
Res. 47/133, art. 18, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/47/49 (Dec. 18, 
1992) (adopted without a vote). 
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tolerate or perpetrate [torture] must be held responsible and severely  
punished.”163 
Furthermore, the 1997 final report prepared by the Special Rapporteur 
on Amnesty provided that “[e]ven when intended to establish conditions 
conducive to a peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation,  
amnesty and other measures of clemency shall be kept within the  
following bounds,” which provide, inter alia, “perpetrators of serious 
crimes under international law may not benefit from such measures  
until”164 the state has “prosecuted, tried, and duly punished [them]”.165 
Over the past few decades, numerous other resolutions and statements 
have been made to the same effect.166 
                                                                                                             
 163. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Commission on Human Rights [CHR] Res. 1999/32, para. 4, CHR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/1999/32 (Apr. 23, 1999). 
 164. Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations  
(Civil and Political): Revised Final Report Prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to  
Sub-Commission Decision 1996/119, CHR, Sub-Commission on Prevention of  
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 49th Sess., princ. 25(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 
Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1 (Oct. 2, 1997). 
 165. Id. princ. 18. 
 166. Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons Who Have  
Committed Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 
Supp. No. at 78, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (“[c]all[ing] upon all states to take 
measures . . . to arrest such persons and extradite them . . . so that they can be brought to 
trial and punished”) (adopted with fifty-five in favor, four against, and thirty-three  
abstentions); RESTATEMENT, § 702, cmt. b (asserting that a state violates customary  
international law “if [the enumerated jus cogens human rights violations], especially by 
its officials, have been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to prevent 
them or to punish the perpetrators”); S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 
25, 1993) (unanimously founding the ICTY “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”); Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, para. 60, 62, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (July 12, 1993) 
 (“States should abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave 
violations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violations . . . [I]t is the 
duty of all States, under any circumstances . . . if allegations are confirmed [that an  
enforced disappearance has taken place], to prosecute its perpetrators.”); S.C. Res. 955, 
para 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR towards the same 
end as that of the ICTY); Rome Statute, infra note 204, at pmbl. (“[r]ecalling that it 
 is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes”); Impunity, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 2002/79, 
para. 11, U.N. CHR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/79 (Apr. 25, 2002) 
(“urg[ing] all States to take effective measures to implement their obligations to  
prosecute or extradite perpetrators of [crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and torture]”). 
  Recent statements by U.N. officials adopt the same position against such  
amnesties. In addition to truth and reconciliation commissions, according to the  
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While these positions against amnesties for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are highly significant, the U.N. has at times either  
assisted in negotiating such amnesties or offered tacit approval.  
Examples of the former include peace agreements in Haiti (1993) and 
South Africa (1994), and an instance of the latter involves a response to 
El Salvador’s amnesty law (1993).167 It is important to note, however, 
                                                                                                             
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations: “‘[W]e must also ensure that any 
amnesty clauses in peace agreements exclude amnesties for war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and other serious violations of international human rights and  
humanitarian law.’” Press Release, Working Justice Systems Vital for UN Peacekeeping 
Success, Security Council Told (Sept. 30, 2003). The Secretary-General also asserted that 
resolutions and mandates should “[r]eject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity.” The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-
General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict  
Societies, para. 64(c), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 
2004). Addressing the Security Council, the U.N. Legal Counsel maintained: “Justice 
should never be sacrificed by granting amnesty in ending conflicts . . . [A]mnesty for 
international crimes [is] now considered unacceptable in international practice.” Press 
Release, Justice Must Not Be Sacrificed to End Conflicts, Security Council Told (June 
22, 2006). 
 167. Trumbull, supra note 10, at 293–94. Although Trumbull also cites a U.N. implicit 
endorsement of Guatemala’s amnesty law, this case should be excluded from the above 
category, as Guatemala’s law was not designed to encompass war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or torture. See Annual Report, Guatemala, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/ 
II.95, doc. 7 rev., para. 30 (1996). 
  The 1996 Abidjan Accord amnestied the acts of the Revolutionary United Front 
of Sierra Leone. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra 
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, art. 14 (Nov. 30, 1996). Non-
etheless, the case of Sierra Leone ultimately warrants exclusion, as the Special  
Representative of the Secretary-General added a statement to his signature of the Lomé 
Accord, asserting “that the UN holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the 
Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.” S.C. Res. 
1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (affirming unanimously). The  
Security Council itself then “reaffirm[ed] further that persons who commit or authorize 
serious violations of international humanitarian law are individually responsible and  
accountable for those violations.” Id. Pursuant to this resolution, the amended Statute of 
the SCSL expressly provides: “[A]n amnesty granted to any person falling within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of 
the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.” Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, art. 10, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145. 
  Finally, U.N. involvement in Liberia should not be so easily construed in favor of 
amnesties. Signed by a U.N. representative, the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
ending hostilities in Liberia included a vague provision leaving open the possibility of a 
general amnesty. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia 
and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement 
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, art. 34, signed Aug. 18, 2003, 
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that these U.N. endorsements took place over a decade ago, and more 
recent positions should also be considered, which suggest greater  
continuity between U.N. principles and practice regarding amnesties.168 
In March 2007, in a report delivered to the Security Council, the  
Secretary General reminded President Hamid Karzai that his Action Plan 
on Peace, Justice and Reconciliation must not bar from prosecution ge-
nocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or gross human rights vi-
olations.169 Similarly, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in May 
2007, advised the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
to ground their peace agreement in international legal standards, relay-
ing: “‘[T]here can be no amnesty for war crimes, crimes against humani-
ty, genocide, and gross violations of human rights.’”170 And as recently 
as July 2007, the U.N. stated that it would boycott East Timor’s Com-
mission of Truth and Friendship if the body did not amend its terms of 
reference to exclude amnesty for genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and gross human rights violations.171 
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/liberia/liberia_08182003_cpa.html. Despite 
this, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (“UNMIL”) was subsequently established via 
a Security Council resolution, which “stresse[d] the need to bring to justice those  
responsible [for human rights violations and atrocities].” S.C. Res. 1509, para. 10, U.N. 
Doc. S/Res/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (adopted unanimously). In November 2005, the  
Security Council passed an additional resolution that, in the event of Charles Taylor’s 
return to Liberia, UNMIL was mandated to “transfer him or facilitate his transfer  
to Sierra Leone for prosecution.” S.C. Res. 1638, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1638 (Nov. 
11, 2005) (adopted unanimously). 
 168. See also Acte d’Engagement, infra note 192. 
 169. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in  
Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, para. 79, delivered 
to the Security Counsel and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2007/152, A/61/799 
(Mar. 15, 2007). 
 170. Press Release, UN Official Urges Ugandan Parties to Put Human Rights at Centre 
of Talks (May 11, 2007). 
 171. Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Says U.N. Officials Will Not 
Testify at Timor-Leste Commission, As Terms of Reference Include Possible Amnesty 
for Human Rights Violations, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11101 (July 26, 2007). 
  Regarding Algeria specifically, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, Yakin Ertürk, issued a recent report on women in Algeria that recommended 
“adopt[ing] a zero tolerance policy towards all forms of violence against women and girls 
and diligently record, investigate and prosecute all cases.” Report of the Special  
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk, 
U.N. Human Rights Council, 70th Sess., Agenda Item 3, para. 104(a), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
7/6/Add.2 (2008). The report specified that “all identified perpetrators of sexual violence 
should be exempted from amnesty and brought to justice.” Id. para. 104(b). 
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F. State Practice 
Against this abundance of judicial decisions, treaties, resolutions, and 
statements supporting a duty to prosecute war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, gross human rights violations, genocide and torture, in the past 
twenty-five years, numerous countries have issued amnesties for such 
crimes, including: Afghanistan,172 Argentina,173 Cambodia,174 Chile,175 
Colombia,176 El Salvador,177 Haiti,178 Honduras,179 Lebanon,180  
Mauritania,181 Peru,182 Sierra Leone,183 South Africa,184 Uganda,185 and 
Uruguay.186 Some of the provisions of these laws, though, are more  
tailored in procedure and scope.187 Nevertheless, what these cases share 
                                                                                                             
 172. Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: Amnesty Law Draws Criticism, Praise,  
Eurasia Insight, Mar. 17, 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp 
0317.7.shtml. 
 173. Supra Part III(b)–(c). 
 174. Ronald C. Slye, The Cambodian Amnesties: Beneficiaries and the Temporal 
Reach of Amnesties for Gross Violation of Human Rights, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 99, 101–03 
(2004). 
 175. Supra Part III(b)–(c). 
 176. Juan Forero, New Colombia Law Grants Concession to Paramilitaries, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2005. 
 177. Supra Part III(b). 
 178. Haitians Vote Amnesty But Terms Are Vague, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994. 
 179. Honduras: Continued Struggle Against Impunity, Amnesty International,  
Mar. 27, 1996, 4, http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR370011996ENGLISH/$File/ 
AMR3700196.pdf [hereinafter Struggle Against Impunity]. 
 180. Amnesty Ratified in Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1991. 
 181. 13th Activity Report of the ACHPR, supra note 124. 
 182. Supra Part III(b). 
 183. Supra Part III(a). 
 184. Supra Part III(a). 
 185. The Amnesty Act, 2000, art. 3, Conciliation Resources, Our Work, Accord, 
Northern Uganda, Additional Keytexts, www.c-r.org (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). In  
February 2008, the Ugandan government and Lord’s Resistance Army / Movement 
signed an annex agreement that provides for the creation of a special domestic court to 
prosecute “serious crimes” perpetrated during Uganda’s conflict. How this agreement 
will affect the Amnesty Act and the extent to which “traditional justice mechanisms” will 
influence or supplement the court’s proceedings remains to be seen. Annexure to the 
Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation art. 7, 9–14, 23, Feb. 19, 2008, 
http://mediacentre.go.ug/uploads/Signed%20Annexure%20to%20Agreement%20on%2
0Accountability%20and%20Reconciliation.19.02.08%20_1_.pdf. 
 186. Supra Part III(b). 
 187. For example, the amnesty law adopted in February 2007 in Afghanistan bars the 
state from bringing prosecutions for war crimes on its own initiative, but acknowledges 
victims’ legal right to seek justice by allowing them to bring complaints against parties. 
Synovitz, supra note 172. The “Justice and Peace Law” in Colombia offers reduced  
sentences to crimes committed by armed groups, which encompass gross human rights 
2008] ALGERIA'S AMNESTY LAW 1009 
is a dearth of opinio juris, from which state practice must stem.188 A key 
question is whether states adopting amnesty laws can be considered to 
have done so out of a sense of legal obligation when the driving force 
behind their passage is a fraught or forced attempt to secure public  
order.189 These situations have been likened to duress, undermining the 
relative value of this practice as a manifestation of state-perceived rights 
and duties.190 This observation holds true for most, if not all of these  
amnesty laws.191 
                                                                                                             
violations. Annual Report, Columbia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 
1, para. 14 (2006); Annual Report, Colombia, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, 
doc. 5, para. 14, 17 (2005). 
 188. Opinio juris, short for opinio juris sive necessitates, signifies “from a sense of 
legal obligations.” RESTATEMENT § 102, cmt. c. 
 189. Illustratively, in response to the HRC’s appraisal of the Charter, the Algerian 
government stated that the Charter “is a political text and should not, therefore, elicit 
comment from a legal body.” Characterizing the Charter as an expression of “the  
unanimous will of the Algerian people,” the government then asserted that the Charter 
and accompanying decrees do not “favour impunity or amnesty.” U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., Comments by the Government of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria 
to the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, para. 1, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/DZA/CO/3/Add.1 (2007). 
 190. See, e.g., O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 262–63. For evidence that Uruguay, Chile, El 
Salvador, and the United States have acknowledged the importance of prosecuting human 
rights violations, see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 94, at 496–98. But see Scharf, supra note 
93, at 58–59. 
 191. O’SHEA, supra note 79, at 262–63. States have diplomatically recognized other 
countries’ amnesty laws. For example, the United States, France and the European Union 
backed the Charter based ostensibly on its accompanying referendum. Infra note 268. 
However, one encounters the same problem in assessing whether this recognition follows 
from opinio juris, a problem that is especially attenuated given that policy considerations, 
not a legal understanding of humanitarian and human rights principles, may be the  
overriding factor in issuing approval. See, e.g., id. Guidelines for assessing customary 
human rights law serve to downplay the importance of this particular evidence of custom. 
According to the Restatement: “[O]ther states are only occasionally involved in monitor-
ing [international human rights] law through ordinary diplomatic practice. Therefore, the 
practice of states that is accepted as building customary international law of human rights 
includes some forms of conduct different from those that build customary international 
law generally.” RESTATEMENT § 701, note 2. The Restatement then proceeds to elaborate 
upon forms of conduct specific to human rights law. Importantly, the consequence of 
diplomatic practice towards other states is limited to the following: “invocation of human 
rights principles in national policy, in diplomatic practice, in international organization 
activities and actions; and other diplomatic communications or action by states reflecting 
the view that certain practices violate international human rights law, including condem-
nation and other adverse state reactions to violations by other states.” Id. Compare, id., 
with id. § 102, cmt. b. In the case of Algeria, for example, neither of the above affirma-
tions of the Charter holds weight, as they respectively invoked principles of democracy, 
not those of human rights, and affirmed rather than criticized the state’s practice. 
1010 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
Furthermore, two recent instances of state practice demonstrate a 
commitment to respecting a duty to prosecute when amnesty laws are 
negotiated and ratified. In January 2008, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and several armed groups within the country signed a peace 
agreement that expressly excludes from a prospective amnesty law war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed from June 
2003 to the present.192 Additionally, Iraq’s parliament passed a  
U.S.-backed amnesty law in February 2008 that precludes its application 
to persons convicted of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and  
genocide.193 
There is also a closely related trend of amnesty laws functioning as 
stopgaps, where amnestied violations are prosecuted years later at less 
harrowing junctures. In 1996, the Special Prosecutor for Human Rights 
in Honduras indicted ten military officers for the 1982 attempted murder 
and unlawful detention of six students. The officers argued that they 
were immune from prosecution under the 1991 amnesty law, an  
argument the country’s supreme court unanimously rejected.194  
Beginning in the late 1990s, courts in Chile exploited loopholes in the 
                                                                                                             
 192. Acte d’Engagement art., 4(1), Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.rfi.fr/radiofr/images/097/ 
Actedengagement_Goma080123.pdf. Significantly, this act was negotiated by the United 
Nations, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, United States, African 
Union, and European Union, and all five parties emphasized article 4, which provides for 
the exclusion in question. Id. pmbl. 
 193. Qānūn al-’afū al-’ām, art. 2(a), Feb. 17, 2008, http://parliament.iq/Iraqi_Council_ 
of_Representatives.php?name=articles_ajsdyawqwqdjasdba46s7a98das6dasda7das4da6d 
8asdsawewqeqw465e4qweq4wq6e4qw8eqwe4qw6eqwe4sadkj&file=showdetails&sid=4 
31; Statute of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, art.1(2), Oct. 18, 2005. For an English 
translation of the “General Amnesty Law,” see Travis Sharp, Full Text of Iraq’s Recenty 
Passed Amnesty Law, Iraq Insider, Mar. 7, 2008, http://theiraqinsider.blogspot.com/ 
2008/03/full-text-of-iraqs-recently-passed.html. 
  Albeit more modest, regarding impunity more generally, another example of state 
practice indirectly supporting a duty to prosecute is President Jose Ramos Horta of Timor 
Leste’s request that the East Timor Court of Appeals issue an opinion on whether a  
pardon passed by East Timor’s parliament is constitutional and violates the state’s  
international obligations. This law could shield perpetrators of a range of crimes, such as  
firearms offenses, crimes against security, and larceny, committed between April 2006 
and April 2007. Timor Crime Law Goes to Court, THE AGE, July 4, 2007, 
http://www.theage.com; Anselmo Lee, Open Letter to President Jose Ramos-Horta on 
Impunity and Rights Violations, Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific,  
June 21, 2007, http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/statements/2007/forumasia_openletter 
tojoseramos-horta_210607.htm. 
 194. Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 179, at 5–6. It appears, however, that  
subsequent threats from the military thwarted these efforts towards accountability. See 
SRIRAM, infra note 209, at 42. 
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state’s amnesty law in order to prosecute disappearances.195 Argentina 
has been fully active in its prosecutions since 2005.196 In 2005, a  
Peruvian judge ordered the arrest of more than 100 military officers  
implicated in a 1988 massacre, and historically, in September 2007, Pe-
ru’s ex-president Alberto Fujimori was transferred from Chile to Peru, 
where he will stand trial before the country’s supreme court for  
authorizing murders.197 Likewise, in late 2006, a Uruguayan court 
charged eight former police and military officers with kidnapping and 
conspiracy related to disappearances and overturned as unconstitutional 
pardons for two of the accused.198 
G. A Customary Duty to Prosecute 
To synthesize the evidence analyzed, robust opinio juris against  
amnesties for universal crimes is found in international, regional,  
national judicial decisions199 as well as administrative opinions, with the 
                                                                                                             
 195. Rohter, supra note 150. 
 196. Most recently, for example, the courts are poised to criminally try the country’s 
ex-president for human rights violations during the Dirty War. James M. Yoch, Jr.,  
Argentina Ex-President to Face Trial for Alleged ‘Dirty War’ Rights Abuses, JURIST, 
Mar. 22, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/argentina-ex-president-to-
face-trial.php. 
 197. Howard Kline, Peru Ex-President Fujimori Facing Four Trials Starting in  
November, JURIST, Oct. 6, 2007, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/10/peru-ex-
president-fujimori-facing-four.php. 
 198. Lisl Brunner, Uruguay Indicts 8 for Operation Condor Disappearances,  
JURIST, Sept. 12, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/09/uruguay-indicts-8-
for-operation-condor.php. 
  After or during periods of transition, within the last few decades, countries  
without amnesty laws have also prosecuted international crimes in their national courts. 
For example, in 1975, Greece commenced criminal trials against the junta, which  
overthrew the government in 1967 and carried out torture and arbitrary arrests. (Greece 
pronounced an “amnesty,” however it covered political crimes and did not apply to 
crimes of the junta.) SRIRAM, infra note 209, at 49–50. After the Bolivian congress 
brought charges in 1986 against members of the security forces, military, and junta, as 
well as General Luis Garcia Meza, who ruled from 1980–1981, the supreme court  
ultimately convicted defendants of torture, arbitrary detention, and murder. Though the 
general became a fugitive, eleven of the guilty were imprisoned. Id. at 47. Border guards 
were convicted in the early nineties for shooting at East Germans who attempted to flee 
the country, and in 1997 several ex-officials were found guilty on similar charges. Id. at 
55–56. Also, a number of convictions were issued against members of security forces in 
Sri Lanka for disappearances. Id. at 70. 
 199. “In determining whether a rule has become international law, substantial weight is 
accorded to: (a) judgments and opinions of international judicial and arbitral tribunals;  
(b) judgments and opinions of national judicial tribunals.” RESTATEMENT § 103(2). 
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limited exception of the South African Court.200 These are matched by 
widely supported General Assembly resolutions201 and plentiful U.N. 
reports and official statements. With regard to state practice, numerous 
states have passed amnesty laws for serious international crimes, but this 
pattern is largely undercut by a lack of requisite opinio juris. And states 
have either repealed, in whole or in part, amnesty laws covering such 
breaches, and several have begun or attempted to prosecute amnestied 
crimes. 
It is important to confront the bugaboo of this operation: State  
practice.202 Based on its relative frailty, critics have often dismissed the 
argument that a duty to prosecute exists as merely aspirational.  
Nevertheless, these dismissals fail to take into account the very nature of 
public humanitarian law and human rights law, which have traditionally 
relied upon opinio juris in order to accommodate normative concerns 
unique to these bodies of law.203 Even though a practice of prosecuting 
                                                                                                             
 200. The Lomé Amnesty Decision is complex, as the SCSL generally rejected  
amnesties for international crimes, but maintained that the amnesty in question did not 
serve as a bar primarily based upon the jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it by statute, 
leaving it up to the national court to decide whether to accept the amnesty for  
jurisdictional purposes. Thus, when the SCSL noted that a customary norm against such 
amnesties was crystallizing, this should not be construed as opinio juris against these 
laws per se. Rather, it was more a reluctant declaration on the general status of custom. 
See supra Part III(a). 
 201. For example, General Assembly resolution 3074 was passed by a unanimous vote 
of ninety-four, with twenty-nine abstentions. Principles of International Co-operation, 
supra note 160. Those abstaining could have openly voted against the resolution, but 
chose not to, which suggests an extreme uneasiness towards not supporting an affirmative 
duty to prosecute and punish war crimes and crimes against humanity. Moreover, as 
backing for U.N. resolutions requires “general support,” RESTATEMENT § 701, note 2., 
this vote satisfies the threshold for inclusion as custom. 
 202. There has been significant tension between what has been identified as “modern” 
and “traditional” custom. If the former prioritizes opinio juris, thereby allowing custom 
to come into being more rapidly, the latter prioritizes state practice, thereby retarding the 
speed at which custom is realized. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and  
Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 757, 758–60 (2001). This Note relies upon the Restatement, which exhibits greater 
sensitivity to human rights and is widely supported in its more flexible approach. See, 
e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary International Human 
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8–14, n.72 (1995). 
 203. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Military and  
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), para. 183–209, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). See, e.g., 
Frederic J. Kirgis, Jr., Appraisals of the ICJ’s Decision: Nicaragua v. United States  
(Merits), 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 149 (1987) (maintaining that while a customary analysis 
favoring opinio juris might seem incoherent with the more traditional emphasis on state 
practice, this discrepancy can be explained by reference to a sliding scale, positing that 
the relative weight of either element is based upon “the activity in question and on the 
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international crimes is modest, it is nonetheless existent and the tendency 
of states to pass amnesty laws should not outweigh near unanimous opi-
nio juris. It is therefore wholly appropriate to assert a duty to  
prosecute the most serious war crimes204 and crimes against humanity, 
which represent the severest classes of violations. 
Turning to policy issues, it has been argued that the sheer scale of  
potential prosecutions to be brought after armed conflicts makes any duty 
to prosecute unmanageable, especially given the limited strength and 
independence of the judiciaries in many if not most of the states  
experiencing such struggles.205 This position, however, spawns an  
intolerable paradox: The more pervasive the atrocities, the less  
accountability may be demanded. If a state does not have sufficient  
capacity to handle prosecutions, it is all the more reason to support the 
development of appropriate mechanisms,206 not to make concessions to a 
fundamentally deficient status quo. Likewise, allowing states to excuse 
                                                                                                             
reasonableness of the asserted customary rule”); Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why 
a Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy 
and Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 117-119 
(supporting the Filartiga approach, and asserting that the decision “implied that, at least 
in terms of the [customary international law] of human rights, official state  
pronouncements were of greater evidentiary significance than reports of contrary state 
practice”); John Tasioulas, In Defense of Normative Relativity: Communitarian Values 
and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 85 (1996) (arguing in support of 
the Nicaragua approach and noting that “a clearly demonstrated opinio juris may  
establish a norm despite a lack of general state practice consistent with the putative 
norm”). But see Anthony D’Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 101 (1987) (criticizing Nicaragua). See also, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 113 (1991) (“The burden of 
proof to be discharged in establishing custom in the field of human or humanitarian rights 
is . . . less onerous than in other fields of international law.”). 
 204. Namely, these are found in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. As 
accordingly set forth in the Rome Statute, such crimes include the following: “violence to 
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture”; 
“committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment”; “taking of hostages”; “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of  
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,  
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.” Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.83/9 (July 
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For concision, “war crimes” will hereinafter be 
used to refer to these violations only. 
 205. Ratner, supra note 130, at 719–20. To an extent, prosecutorial discretion will 
provide relief by limiting judicial scope. There is the danger that this discretion will be 
used to accomplish victors’ justice, but this may be offset by the principle that those most 
responsible for the abuses should be prosecuted. See, e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 
2601–03. 
 206. See Extradite or Prosecute Report, supra note 98. 
1014 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:3 
themselves based on scarce state resources207 and the expense of criminal 
trials is a failure to invest in the rule of law in cases where it matters 
most. 
A duty to prosecute must also confront situations in which an amnesty 
law is considered the only viable way of ending violence.208 Based on 
this dilemma, it has been proposed that in order to form a more nuanced 
customary rule towards amnesties, striking a balance “between” justice 
and peace,209 recognition of an amnesty law should be partially  
determined by whether the legislation “is reasonably necessary to end the 
hostilities.”210 This criterion is quite fair. If a general rule accommodated 
this factor, however, what will prevent states from timing the legislation 
of amnesty laws to coincide with what appear to be alleviating  
circumstances giving rise to an exception? Hopefully, there will also 
come a time when the state enjoys relative stability within the same  
generation. Is it then appropriate to maintain support for an active  
amnesty law when it is no longer justified on this initial prescribed basis? 
This question closely relates to the further quandary that prosecutions 
will shatter a fragile peace, destabilizing a country, as those in power or 
those who have relinquished power but still exert extreme pressure on 
the government are more often than not implicated in the crimes to be 
                                                                                                             
 207. See Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of 
South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at para. 42–49 (S. Afr.) (including this argument in 
its section on civil remedies). 
 208. It is not wholly clear whether a general duty to prosecute is necessarily disadvan-
tageous in this context. A state might be able to drive a hard bargaining line by offering 
insurgents a choice between a possible commuting of punishment and a maximum  
sentence, rather than between criminal impunity and continued battle. This would hinge 
on whether those fighting prefer the risk of maintaining the struggle to the near certainty 
of some criminal punishment. Also, there would then arise the issue of to what extent a 
state could commute a given sentence, as in principle punishment must appropriately 
reflect the gravity of the offense committed. While there are difficulties surrounding the 
compatibility of prosecutions and ending recurrent violence, there are also hurdles  
involved in brokering a peace deal that amnesties war crimes and crimes against  
humanity, as any peace process relies on the assumption that those involved favor peace 
to sustaining conflict. Favoring the latter is tragically all too easy; this choice follows 
from entrenched convictions rooted in the very causes giving rise to violence in the first 
place. See infra Conclusion. 
 209. See Bassiouni, supra note 130, at 11–13 (calling into question justice and peace 
being framed as a dichotomy). For a valuable case study that closely examines states in 
transition in order to analyze patterns affecting the capacity for accountability and that 
maintains peace and justice are not opposed, but rather exist along a continuum, see 
CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, CONFRONTING PAST HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: JUSTICE AND 
PEACE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION (2004). 
 210. See Trumbull, supra note 10, at 316–19, 325–27 (arguing for a three-part  
balancing test, involving process, substance and circumstances). 
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prosecuted. Considering the balance of power to assist in the  
determination of whether an amnesty law should be supported is reason-
able,211 but it is not unproblematic. Incorporation of this factor into a  
legal rule would persistently stamp out state practice.212 Virtually all 
states that have amnestied war crimes or crimes against humanity have 
suffered from political and civil instability when these laws were passed. 
And again, must it be accepted that the right to demand accountability is 
forever denied because an amnesty law coincided with a transition  
towards general welfare, even if power has since shifted to offer the  
opportunity for fair prosecutions? 
The two criteria referenced above—whether amnesty laws are  
reasonably required to stop conflicts, and whether state balance of power 
necessitates their adoption—are essentially dilutions of the necessity  
defense in international law.213 Although such elements can certainly be 
incorporated into the content of the rule itself, this would thereby  
preclude the application of this tailored extraordinary defense,214 which 
raises cause for concern. The purpose of the necessity defense’s “strict 
limitations [is] to safeguard against possible abuse,”215 which, it has been 
suggested, is precisely the danger these two propositions present. 
If ending impunity is to be considered a fundamental universal interest 
worthy of being furthered, it is crucial to have a strong rule, rather than a 
                                                                                                             
 211. See Arnould, supra note 10, at 230–31 (setting aside legal considerations to  
analyze whether the Charter is justified on the basis of two factors taken from Sriram’s 
study). Sriram, however, identifies these factors to inform whether accountability can be 
achieved, not whether it should be sought. SRIRAM, supra note 209, at 20–33, 203. 
 212. While this might seem circular, skeptics of a general duty to prosecute do not 
generally base their objections on the normative desirability of such a rule, but rather on 
its practical ramifications for developing nations. See, e.g., Trumbull, supra note 10 
(formulating criteria towards channeling possibly emergent state practice against amnesty 
laws). 
 213. To invoke a successful necessity defense in international law, a state must prove 
that the wrongful act “is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril” and “does not seriously impair an essential interest of 
the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community 
as a whole.” And necessity may not be invoked where the wrongful act violates a jus 
cogens norm, or where “the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.” Interna-
tional Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts With Commentaries, art. 25, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles]. For a recent appraisal, see Sarah F. Hill, 
The “Necessity Defense” and the Emerging Arbitral Conflict in it Application to the 
U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 547, 549–57 
(2007) (supporting the Draft Articles while acknowledging criticisms). 
 214. The examples provided in the Draft Articles include humanitarian intervention 
and military necessity. See Draft Articles, supra note 213, art. 25, cmt. 20. 
 215. Id. art. 25, cmt. 2. 
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more specific norm that creates loopholes from its very inception. Where 
a state explicitly or tacitly uses criminal immunity as an indispensable 
political bargaining chip in negotiating peace agreements or beneficial 
transfers of power, a near inevitable reality, and then enshrines this  
immunity in an amnesty law covering war crimes or crimes against  
humanity, such law should be treated as a breach, not a customary  
exception based on expediency.216 Otherwise, a legal basis for exerting 
pressure on states to prosecute and supporting those within a state who 
do seek justice will be continually lost,217 which is especially  
troublesome when the arguable “costs” of justice no longer outweigh any 
“benefits” of peace. This rule is neither radical nor novel. It essentially 
parallels the approach of the CAT and HRC,218 African Commission,219 
and Inter-American System.220 
Although it could be maintained that the presence of a clear obligation 
will undermine any leverage criminal immunity may possess, this is an 
overstatement in the majority of cases. A general duty to prosecute is 
unlikely to pose much of a new threat to perpetrators. When national 
prosecutions for amnestied international crimes have actually taken 
place, it is only years later, and only after extremely persistent efforts are 
paired with opportune circumstances. Also, given the flexibility  
prosecutorial discretion provides a state, those who stand to lose might 
be correct in assessing the chances of a criminal suit being brought as 
slim. Lastly, even without an obligation to prosecute, there is always 
some menace of accountability. National amnesty laws in certain  
circumstances do not bar jurisdiction in foreign state courts over crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and torture,221 and the ICC prosecutor may 
choose not to accept a state’s amnesty law.222 More importantly, the fear 
among perpetrators that states might not forever abide by their amnesty 
laws may always remain to some degree, given the frequent unpopularity 
of these laws and their groundings on power balances, which are subject 
to shift. 
The peace agreements in question, admittedly, present some further 
difficulty. If foreign states or the U.N. participate in negotiations leading 
to an amnesty for war crimes or crimes against humanity, there is the 
                                                                                                             
 216. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing  
Accountability Over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 191 (2003). 
 217. See Orentlicher, supra note 92, at 2547–48. 
 218. See supra Part II(c)–(d). 
 219. See supra Part II(e). 
 220. See supra Part III(b). 
 221. Boed, supra note 130. 
 222. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 17(1)(b), 17(2)(a). 
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danger of losing credibility. Parties to peace agreements may require  
arbiters to commit on paper to such legally compromising terms. One 
option is to concede the illegal provisions, when absolutely necessary, 
but append a disclaimer, as the U.N. official did in the case of the Lomé 
Accords. This might be considered a superficial response, but the danger 
of realpolitik is precisely why international law is formed not only by 
what states do and say, but also by opinio juris. 
IV. ALGERIA AND THE DUTY TO PROSECUTE 
Algeria is thus confronted with two sets of legal obligations. While the 
Charter breaches those established by treaty,223 does it amnesty war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, thereby contravening the general 
duty to prosecute? This section suggests that the Charter extinguishes 
liability for both categories of crimes. Furthermore, prosecuting these 
violations would be in keeping with the desires of a considerable number 
of Algerians whose lives these violations have affected. 
A. The Charter: Amnestying War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
The Charter unquestionably amnesties war crimes.224 Encompassing 
disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings,225 war crimes must 
                                                                                                             
 223. In Algeria, international and regional agreements are accorded a higher status  
than domestic law: “Treaties ratified by the President of the Republic in accordance  
with the conditions provided for by the Constitution are superior to the law.” 
CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE ALGÉRIENNE DÉMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE [Constitu-
tion] ch. 2, art. 132 (Alg.). The country’s Constitutional Council embraced this provision 
in a 1989 decision, which stated: “[A]fter its ratification and publication, every conven-
tion is integrated into national law and through application of article 123 [sic] of the con-
stitution, acquires a superior authority to the law, allowing every Algerian citizen to 
claim it in front of the courts.” Décision n° 1-D-L-CC-89 of 20 août 1989 relative au 
code electoral, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.dz/indexFR.htm (author’s 
translation).   
 224. War crimes and crimes against humanity may take place within an internal armed 
conflict, and thus non-state actors are responsible. William A. Schabas, Theoretical and 
International Framework: Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907, 918–22 (2003). See also, Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 
G.A. Res. 2391, art. 2, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 18, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Nov. 26, 
1968); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (1995) (setting forth that non-state actors 
may violate war crimes and genocide).  
  The armed groups in Algeria satisfy the non-state actor requirements of Protocol 
II, as “under responsible command, [they] exercise[d] such control over a part of  
[Algeria’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military  
operations[.]” Protocol II, supra note 83, art. 1. They also fall under the less stringent 
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have been carried out against civilians.226 In addition, they must have 
taken place within the context of an “armed conflict,” which has been 
defined by the ICTY in Tadic as “protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
groups within a State.”227 As violence by armed groups broke out in  
Algeria towards the end of 1992 and the regime was soon after unable to 
put a stop to their daily attacks,228 by definition, armed conflict began at 
this juncture. The point of commencement appears clear enough, but has 
the armed conflict ended, and if so, when? Again, according to the 
ICTY: “[I]nternational humanitarian law . . . extends beyond the  
cessation of hostilities until . . . a peaceful settlement is achieved.”229 
While violence between the regime and insurgency noticeably declined 
by 1999230 and many members of armed groups have laid down their 
weapons, it is quite difficult to conclude that a “peaceful settlement” has 
in fact occurred when fatal clashes and bomb attacks have persisted.231 
Thus, war crimes involve the period from late 1992 through the present. 
Post-1992, particular Islamist factions at different times abducted,  
tortured,232 and murdered civilians.233 And it has been extensively  
documented that state security forces committed all three of the above 
crimes against non-combatants.234 
Considerably more complex by definition, crimes against humanity  
introduce a series of necessary elements, ensuring that their intended  
superlative severity is preserved.235 This category of crimes has been 
                                                                                                             
definition of non-state actors in the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 
8(2)(f). 
 225. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 8(2)(c). 
 226. These are “persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part 
in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted.” Protocol II, supra note 83, 
art. 4(1). The term “civilian” will hereinafter be referred to in this sense. 
 227. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for  
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
 228. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 186–88. 
 229. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction, para. 70 (Oct. 2, 1995). 
 230. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 261. 
 231. See infra notes 302–306 and accompanying text. 
 232. Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 24; Smith, infra note 294. 
 233. See infra Part IV(a). 
 234. See infra Part IV(a). 
 235. This class of crimes appears in various permutations in the Nuremberg Charter as 
well as the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, ICC, SCSL, and Iraqi Higher Criminal Court 
(“IHCC”). Compare Agreement by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the  
Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of 
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most recently set forth in the Rome Statute,236 and may include the acts 
amnestied by the Charter.237 Crimes against humanity are defined in the 
Rome Statute as any of the enumerated acts when (1) “committed as part 
of a widespread or systematic,” (2) “attack directed against any civilian 
population,” (3) “with knowledge of the attack.”238 The second factor 
further requires a state or organizational policy.239 
Enforced disappearances are inherently such crimes when committed 
on a widespread or systematic basis.240 As this requirement is framed in 
the disjunctive, “widespread” alone is sufficient241 and has been defined 
as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with 
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of  
                                                                                                             
Soviet Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War  
Criminals of the European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), 
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, art. 5, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, art. 3, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 
1994); Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
art. 10, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145; Statute of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, art. 
12, Dec. 10, 2003. For exploration of the development of crimes against humanity, see 
Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the 
Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 77–91 (2004); Simon 
Chesterman, An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against 
Humanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 308–14 (2000); Phyllis Hwang, Defining 
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 22 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998); Darryl Robinson, Developments in International  
Criminal Law: Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 44–45 (1999). 
 236. The definition of crimes against humanity is near identical in the ICC and IHCC 
statutes. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7, with Statute of the Iraqi Higher 
Criminal Court, art. 12, Dec. 10, 2003. 
 237. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(1)(a), 7(1)(f), 7(1)(i) (murder, torture, and 
enforced disappearances, respectively). 
 238. Id. art. 7(1). 
 239. An “attack directed against any civilian population” is defined as a “course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack.” Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. (7)(2)(a). 
 240. See International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance art. 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP.1/REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005) 
[hereinafter Convention on Disappearance]. 
 241. “Systematic basis” is presently harder to demonstrate in this case. It must be  
“pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy.” Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind With Commentaries, art. 18, cmt. 3, in Report of the International 
Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eight Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. 
No. 10, at 14, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996). 
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victims.”242 With no less than 6146 Algerians disappeared by the state,243 
the scale of the missing was one of the worst in the last decade of the 
twentieth century.244 These acts were widespread, and therefore are 
crimes against humanity. Concerning armed groups, it is unlikely that the 
many abductions they carried out245 fit the definition of “enforced  
disappearances”246 because these groups were not “political  
organizations” in the usual sense of the term; rather, they were highly 
fractured entities composed of various informal cells that worked under 
distinct local leadership.247 Quite probably, most victims who were  
abducted were shortly thereafter murdered. There were, however, cases 
of armed groups holding women captive in their camps and later  
releasing them, at least sometimes after raping them. While such  
instances could fit the definition of other enumerated crimes against  
humanity,248 approximately how many women lived through this type of 
experience is unknown.249 
                                                                                                             
 242. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580  
(Sept. 2, 1999). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and  
Judgment, para. 649. (May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Mile Msksic, Miroslav Radic, and 
Veselin Sljivancanin, (Case No. IT-95-13-R 61) Review of the Indictment Pursuant to 
Rule 61 of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence, April 3, 1996, at para. 29, quoted in 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, at para. 643 (May 7, 1997). 
 243. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 244. Time for Reckoning, supra note 42. 
 245. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1999, Human Rights Watch, http://www. 
hrw.org/wr2k/Mena-01.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 246. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(2)(i). 
 247. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 183, 221, 231; Algeria: Human Rights  
Developments 1995, supra note 36. While the FIS was certainly a political organization, 
generally, it does not appear that those who committed violent acts against civilians were 
directly connected to the party. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1993, Human 
Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Middle-01.htm#P63_37797 (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1996, Human Rights 
Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/ME-01.htm#P89_36462 (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2008). See also supra Part I(b). Moreover, despite some ambiguous statements 
made by the FIS early on in the conflict, representatives came to clearly condemn and 
disassociate the party from abuses on civilians. ROBERTS, supra note 43, at 172; Algeria: 
Human Rights Developments 1992, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/1993/WR93/Mew-01.htm#P71_39546 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria:  
Human Rights Developments 1993, supra note 247; Algeria: Human Rights Develop-
ments 1994, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/MIDEAST-
01.htm#P90_29860 (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments 
1995, supra note 36. 
 248. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(1)(e), 7(1)(h). 
 249. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 219–20. 
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Regarding torture, tens of thousands of Algerians have suffered this 
abuse.250 In all likelihood, state forces were responsible for the vast  
majority of these violations,251 thereby establishing a widespread  
practice. The second factor for crimes against humanity, “attack directed 
against any civilian population,” is also satisfied. State-led torture was 
directed against civilians, its victims having protected status whether or 
not they actively participated in the hostilities, as they were necessarily 
detained at the time they were tortured.252 These well-orchestrated253 acts 
of torture carried out at numerous secret detention facilities254 fulfill the 
state policy requirement, which is informal and may be deduced from the 
acts in question.255 The last requirement, “knowledge of the attack,”  
refers to the perpetrator “understand[ing] the overall context of his 
act,”256 a relatively low threshold that is easily satisfied. Thus, state 
forces committed crimes against humanity when they tortured. 
Lastly, extrajudicial killings perpetrated by both security forces and 
armed groups also constitute crimes against humanity. It is first  
                                                                                                             
 250. See supra Part I(b). For testimonies of Algerians who were tortured, see Algérie, 
La machine de mort: Témoignages de victims de la torture, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003), 
http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/machine_mort_temoignages.pdf. 
 251. Based on information culled from a wide variety of sources, a detailed chart of 
300 Algerians who were tortured can be found at Algérie, La machine de mort: 300 cas 
de tortures, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003), http://www.algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/ma 
chine_mort_300_cas.pdf. 296 people were abducted by state agents and the remaining 4 
were the victims of civil militias. Id. at 28, 42, 44–45. 
  One occasionally encounters reported instances of torture by armed guerillas. 
Fear and Silence, supra note 38, at 24; Smith, infra note 294. Although it is possible that 
this practice was frequent enough to be widespread, at present, the available evidence 
does not seem to suggest it. 
 252. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7(2)(e); Protocol II, supra note 83, art. 4(1). 
 253. Algérie, La Machine de mort: Un rapport sur la torture, les centres de détentions 
secrets et l’organisation de la machine de mort, Algeria-Watch (Oct. 2003), http://www. 
algeria-watch.org/pdf/pdf_fr/machine_mort_rapport.pdf. 
 254. Fear and Silence, supra note 38. 
 255. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 653 
(May 7, 1997). As an illustration of just how commonplace torture was in Algeria,  
consider what one local policeman is reported to have told a mother seeking information 
about her disappeared son, “‘Of course we torture people: they always have something to 
confess. You’re all terrorists. You gave birth to terrorists. So everything that’s happening 
is normal.’” Kristianasen, infra note 293. 
 256. Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Judgment, para. 133 (May 21, 
1999). See also Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, para. 
659 (May 7, 1997) (stating “the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the  
civilian population, know that his act fits with the attack and the act must not be taken for 
purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict,” where knowledge may be actual 
or constructive). 
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important to acknowledge that identifying which murders were directed 
against civilians is inherently fact specific.257 Analysis is further  
complicated by the widely held suspicion that the regime infiltrated  
certain armed groups and incited or recruited members to perpetrate  
barbarous acts for the purpose of justifying the 1992 coup and shifting 
public opinion in its favor.258 Similarly, the regime carried out  
indiscriminate attacks and then sought to attribute them to Islamist  
                                                                                                             
 257. In deciding whether an attack was “directed against any civil population,” the 
ICTY set forth the following criteria:  
[I]nter alia, the means and method used in the course of the attack, 
the status of the victims, their number, the discriminatory nature of 
the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course, the  
resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the  
attacking force may be said to have complied or attempted to comply 
with the precautionary requirements of the laws of war.  
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 91 (June 12, 2002) 
(stating that “‘the civilian population is the primary object of the attack.’”). See also 
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 207 (Jan. 27, 2000) (“[T]he fact 
that there are certain individuals among the civilian population who are not civilians does 
not deprive the population of its civilian character.”).  
 258. See generally, e.g., MOHAMMED SAMRAOUI, CHRONIQUE DES ANNÉES DE SANG, 
ALGÉRIE: COMMENT LES SERVICES SECRETS ONT MANIPULÉ LES GROUPES ISLAMISTES  
(Denoel 2003). Such activities are infamously well known among scholars on Algeria: 
[Senior military officers have] been linked to such high-profile  
incidents as kidnapping of three officials from the French embassy in 
Algiers in October 1993; the high-jacking of an Air France Airbus in 
1994; bombings of France’s public transport system, including the 
Paris Metro, in 1995; the kidnapping and murder of the Tibhirine 
monks in 1996, and a number of other such incidents. 
Jeremy Keenan, Waging War on Terror: The Implications of America’s ‘New  
Imperialism’ for Saharan Peoples, 10 J. N. AFR. STUD. 619, 625 (2005) (describing the 
regime’s alleged staging of “terrorist” activities in the Sahara-Sahel region beginning in 
2002). Regarding the junta’s orchestration of the 1995 Paris bomb attacks, which were 
blamed on Algerian fanatics, one former Algerian secret police agent, for example,  
testified that he was instructed to bribe European officials, who were complicit, and  
personally delivered $90,000 in hush money to a member of the French parliament. John 
Sweeney & Leonard Doyle, Algeria Regime ‘Was Behind Paris Bombs,’ Manchester 
Guardian, Nov. 16, 1997, http://desip.igc.org/Algerian.html. See also, e.g., EVANS & 
PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 221–24, 287–88; SOUAÏDIA, supra note 35, at 56–59; YOUS, 
supra note 35; The Junta In Court, supra note 26 (quoting testimony from the former 
Chief of Special Units, who relayed that a colonel, referring to a leader of an armed group 
known for slaughtering women and children, told him, “‘[H]e is our man, you will work 
together with him’”). 
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factions.259 These tactics ultimately led to a commonly asked question 
among Algerians, qui tue qui—“who’s killing whom”? 
Notwithstanding these challenges, certain reasonable appraisals can be 
made. Extrajudicial killings by the regime were widespread. Based only 
on the most reliable and sufficiently specific estimates, hundreds of  
extrajudicial killings were committed by security forces in 1995, 1997, 
and 1998,260 Such acts were also reported in 1994,261 1995, 1999, 2000, 
and 2002, although in lesser general numbers.262 In December 2004, an 
investigator authorized by the government even confessed that security 
forces are thought to have killed a total of 5200 civilians in “illegal 
acts.”263 State forces will again inevitably fall within the two additional 
requirements, organizational policy264 and “knowledge of the attack.” 
                                                                                                             
 259. For example, one family reported that after security forces killed five of their 
immediate male relatives in front of them in their home, the security forces asked them to 
sign a statement that “terrorists” committed the murders. Annual Report for Algeria 1997, 
Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=C31D660257E 
B53E080256A0F005BEA9E&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). See also, e.g., EVANS 
& PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 194–98, 225, 229–31, 246, 249–50, 261–62, 287, 296. 
 260. Annual Report for Algeria 1995, Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/annualreport.php?id=DC29278C303A801680256A0F005BB4B1&c=DZA (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 1997, supra note 259; Annual Report 
for Algeria 1998, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id 
=C91D0197E237ADDE80256A0F005C025D&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 261. For a list of over 100 reported instances of murder(s) carried out by state security 
forces, the majority of which occurred in 1994, see COMITÉ ALGÉRIEN DES MILITANTS 
LIBRES DE LA DIGNITÉ HUMAINE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, LIVRE BLANC SUR LA 
RÉPRESSION EN ALGÉRIE (1991–1994) (OU L’HISTOIRE DE LA TRAGÉDIE D’UN PEOPLE) TOME 
I 63–77 (Hoggar 1995). 
 262. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1995, supra note 36; Algeria: Human 
Rights Developments 1994, supra note 247; Annual Report for Algeria 1999, Amnesty 
International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=A0729B516A6823B0802 
56A0F005C1B25&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2000, 
Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=CCCFC26F040 
13D12802568E400729EC9&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008); Annual Report for 
Algeria 2002, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id= 
2709795C610F55D980256BAE0056CA88&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). 
 263. ROBERT FISK, THE GREAT WAR FOR CIVILIZATION: THE CONQUEST OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST 584 (2005). 
 264. As an illustration of this policy, consider what signs placed on the corpses in one 
city read: “‘[T]his is the fate reserved for those who encourage the terrorists.’” Some of 
the murdered had shattered skulls. Some had had their organs removed. One man’s face 
was beyond recognition due to torture. Firemen told the Algerian Committee of Free 
Activists for Human Dignity and Human Rights that “they had received orders ‘from the 
top’ not to remove the cadavers before eight in the morning so that the population could 
see them in the meantime.” COMITÉ ALGÉRIEN DES MILITANTS LIBRES DE LA DIGNITÉ 
HUMAINE ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME, supra note 261, at 75–76 (author’s translation). 
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Armed groups also murdered civilians. Scores of these deaths, frequently 
estimated to run into the hundreds, were reported each year between 
1993 and 2004. Given the clandestine nature of the conflict, however, 
these approximate death tolls differentiate between neither causes of 
death—whether death was due to a massacre, bomb attack, or individual 
assault—nor groups of non-state actors.265 Even if only a fraction of 
these deaths were due to murder and correctly attributed to a given  
faction, they would almost certainly satisfy the widespread requirement. 
Inferring the remaining two factors should prove unproblematic. Thus, 
murders by opposition forces amount to crimes against humanity, and 
each of the three amnestied abuses perpetrated by the regime likewise fit 
within this category. 
B. Legitimacy by “Democratic” Referendum? 
Under Algeria’s treaty obligations as well as the customary duty to 
prosecute, a referendum on the amnestying of grave human rights  
violations,266 war crimes, or crimes against humanity is ipso facto void. 
Nevertheless, the legal unsoundness of the Charter established in Parts II 
and III of this Note may seem troubling, as the official vote tally for the 
                                                                                                             
 265. Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1993, Human Rights Watch, http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Middle-01.htm#P63_37797 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); 
Algeria: Human Rights Developments 1994, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/1995/WR95/MIDEAST-01.htm#P90_29860 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria: 
Human Rights Developments 1995, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
1996/WR96/MIDEAST-01.htm#P137_26320 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria:  
Human Rights Developments 1996, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
1997/WR97/ME-01.htm#P89_36462 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights 
Developments 1997, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Mideast-
01.htm#P207_37583 (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Algeria: Human Rights Developments 
1998, Human Rights Watch, http://hrw.org/worldreport99/mideast/algeria.html (last  
visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 1997, supra note 259; Annual Report 
for Algeria 1998, supra note 260; Annual Report for Algeria 1999, supra note 262; An-
nual Report for Algeria 2000, supra note 262; Annual Report for Algeria 2001, Amnesty  
International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=426DF7C05D7F48A5802 
56A16004BE7EE&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2002, 
supra note 262; Annual Report for Algeria 2003, Amnesty International, http://www. 
amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=2A0BB2E9CC487AEC80256D24003790E9&c=DZA 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2008); Annual Report for Algeria 2004, Amnesty International, 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=29F1B4B25091AC9980256E9E005A
99AC&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). 
 266. See, e.g., Mendoza, supra note 141, para. 32 (referring to Uruguay’s plebiscite on 
its amnesty law and stating that “[a] fortiori, a country cannot by internal legislation 
evade its international obligations”). 
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Charter referendum might suggest wide support.267 On this assumption, 
representatives of the United States, France, and the European Union 
formally endorsed the Charter.268 These officials were apparently  
undisturbed by the following question: Does democracy support the 
proposition that a majority vote can be taken on the denial of citizens’ 
rights?269 The paramount issue, though, is whether the referendum  
accurately reflects the wishes of the victims, which presents difficult and 
divisive issues. Virtually all of Algeria suffered, but are all Algerians 
victims, as the state maintains?270 While the capacity for human  
compassion towards the pain of others should not be denied, is vicarious 
the same as personally endured suffering? 
Even if one responds to this question in the affirmative—deeming the 
overwhelming majority of the Algerian people to be the victims—there is 
still good reason to be highly skeptical of the referendum as an  
expression of broad backing for the Charter. Unverified by any  
independent audit,271 the plebiscite took place in a police state where 
                                                                                                             
 267. See Algeria Today, supra note 64. 
 268. U.S. Respects Algeria Reconciliation Charter, State Welch Says, U.S.  
International Information Programs, Mar. 20, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/ 
display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=March&x=20060320160211ndyblehs0.10 
67469; Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Paris, Algeria /  
Referendum (Sept. 30, 2005); Press Release, European Union, Declaration by the  
Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on Algeria’s Referendum on a Charter for 
Peace and National Reconciliation (Oct. 10, 2005). 
 269. U.S. and French interests are not limited to significant investment ties with  
Algeria. Both American and French intelligence services have long been suspected of 
collaborating with Algerian secret services during the Dirty War and beyond. See, e.g., 
Keenan, supra note 258, at 628. For an in depth look at France’s support for and  
complicity with Algeria’s mafia-like insiders in their staging of violence and  
manipulations of public opinion, see generally LOUNIS AGGOUN & JEAN-BAPTISTE 
RIVOIRE, FRANÇALGÉRIE, CRIMES ET MENSONGES D’ETATS: HISTOIRE SECRÈTE, DE LA 
GUERRE D’INDÉPENDANCE À LA “TROISIÈME GUERRE” D’ALGÉRIE (Découverte 2004). An 
overview of this book in English can be found at Françalgérie: On the Secret War in 
Algeria and French Machinations, Algeria-Watch, July 2004, http://www.algeria-
watch.org/en/aw/francalgerie.htm. 
  After September 11th, the United States closely allied itself with Algiers, Presi-
dent Bush offering unwavering approval of the regime’s strategy in response to  
“terrorism.” E.g. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 278–79, 287–89, 292. In a display 
characteristic of the Bush administration’s “dead on” understanding of the Middle East 
and North Africa, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and North African 
Affairs told the New York Times: “‘Washington has much to learn from Algeria on ways 
to fight terrorism.’” Steven R. Weisman, U.S. to Sell Military Gear to Algeria to Help it 
Fight Militants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002. 
 270. See Draft Charter, supra note 59. 
 271. Slackman, supra note 65. 
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electoral deceit has been a recurrent allegation.272 There were likewise 
serious charges of fraud surrounding the referendum in question.273 
Moreover, voters might not have fully appreciated the significance of the 
text they were actually given. Those who did vote had only forty-five 
days to consider the Draft Charter, which differed from the final  
legislation in key aspects.274 Freedom of the press is quite poor in  
Algeria.275 Journalists have often been harassed and sacked with heavy 
defamation charges under strict press laws.276 State security forces, for 
example, “savagely attacked” one French journalist who attempted to 
cover the amnesty campaign in September 2005.277 Radio and television, 
the two chief media outlets, are primarily government controlled.278 No 
viewpoint critical of the amnesty was expressed on television.279  
Fittingly, it has been reported that there was little if any debate on the 
Charter leading up to the referendum,280 critics of the law were swiftly 
                                                                                                             
 272. See Observations du Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie sur le  
respect par l’Algérie de ses obligations découlant du Pacte international relatif aux  
droits civils et politiques, Rapport alternatif à l’attention du Comité des droits de 
l’Homme, 90éme session du Comité de droits de l’Homme, Examen du rapport de 
l’Algérie le 23 juillet 2007, at 8, 63–64, 74, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ 
docs/ngos/fidh_algeria.pdf [hereinafter CFDA Rapport]. Even a top Algerian official in 
charge of voting has voiced concern. In a letter dated May 17, 2007 and addressed to 
Boutiflika, Saïd Bouachaïr, the Coordinator of the National Political Commission for the 
Monitoring of Legislative Elections, requested intervention after finding widespread 
fraud in the 2007 parliamentary and regional elections. According to Bouachaïr,  
non-FLN observers were not permitted to monitor polling stations. Voting boxes arrived 
at polling stations pre-filled with pro-FLN votes and some were even stolen after votes 
were cast. Similarly, lists of the candidates running were left incomplete. Letter from 
Saïd Bouachaïr, Al-Lajna al-Siyāsiyya al-Wataniyya li-Murāqabat al-Intikhābāt  
al-Tashrī’yya, ‘udū al-Lajna, Al-munassiq, to Ra’īs al-Jumhūriyya (May 17, 2007),  
reproduced in id. at 77–78. 
 273. See CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 63–64. 
 274. See supra Part I(c). 
 275. Algeria was rated “not free” by the World Audit Organization, landing a score of 
62 out of 100. World Audit Organization, Freedom of the Press Report, Algeria, 
http://www.worldaudit.org/presstable.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter World 
Audit Report]. Similarly, in the 2006 World Press Freedom Index, Algeria ranked 126 
out of 168 countries. Reporters Without Borders For Press Freedom, World Press  
Freedom Index 2006, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=19385 (last visited Nov. 
8, 2007). 
 276. In 2005, for example, there were 114 documented cases of press harassment. U.S. 
Dept. of State, Country Reports of Human Rights Practices, Algeria, Mar. 6, 2007, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78849.htm. 
 277. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 49 (author’s translation). 
 278. World Audit Report, supra note 275. 
 279. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 49. 
 280. Hidouci, infra note 287, at 4. 
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silenced, and “police arrested those who collected signatures” against 
it.281 Those who disfavored the amnesty were harassed, threatened with 
death, and sometimes imprisoned.”282 Freedom of association fairs no 
better.283 No less than three demonstrations against the Charter held by 
families of the disappeared were aggressively dispersed.284 Among  
numerous other restrictions and bans, the Algerian authorities would not 
locate a room for a public gathering to discuss the Charter, a meeting 
which resultantly could not take place.285 Although one can find opinions 
from within Algeria both for and against the amnesty law,286 at present, 
there is little reliable evidence that determines just how representative 
these opinions are287 given the socio-political climate in Algeria as well 
as the specific context of the referendum. 
                                                                                                             
 281. Al Karama for Human Rights and Algeria-Watch, Observations on the Periodic 
Report to the Human Rights Committee, Algeria-Watch, July 23, 2007, http://en.al 
karama.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=45&Itemid=37. 
 282. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 6, 53. 
 283. For a recent analysis of the Algerian law on associations, see Chafika Kahina 
Bouagache, The Algerian Law on Associations Within Its Historical Context, The  
International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law, vol. 8, issue 2, Apr. 2007, http://www.icnl. 
org/knowledge/ijnl/vol9iss2/special_3.htm#_edn1. 
 284. Relatives were questioned and threatened. More ominously, after the authorities 
failed to investigate ten complaints filed by his family, one man whose father was  
disappeared was sued for defamation by the two alleged perpetrators after he made public 
accusations. Belkacem Rachedi was fined and sentenced as a result of at least one of the 
suits. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa. 
org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2006&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 285. Al Karama, supra note 281. 
 286. See, e.g., Daho Djerbal, Algeria: Amnesty and Oligarchy, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Arab Reform Bulletin: October 2005, vol. 3 issue 8, http://www. 
carnegieendowment.org/files/Djerbal.pdf; Louisa Hanoune, On the Eve of the September 
29 Referendum, Fraternité, The Newspaper of the Workers Party of Algeria, Sept. 11, 
2005, http://www.eit-ilc.org/us/articles.php?Ing=en&pg=455. For a collection of articles 
addressing the “reconciliation” process, the majority of which were authored by  
Algerians, see QUELLE RÉCONCILIATION POUR ALGÉRIE (2005), available at http://www. 
hoggar.org/books/Reconciliation/Reconciliation.pdf. Twenty of the twenty-seven  
contributors signed an appended list of recommendations that, among other things, calls 
for “instructing and judging those most responsible for the most serious crimes  
(massacres, forced disappearances, rapes, and torture)” as well as “excluding serious 
crimes with respect to international law” from an amnesty. Id. at 228 (author’s  
translation). 
 287. Echoing the overall suspiciousness of the referendum, the former  
Algerian Minister of Economics and Finances (1989–1991), Ghazi Hidouci, has  
asserted that the government strategically employed voting in order to bypass  
public debate and use “the will of the people” as a buffer against conflicting  
international law. Ghazi Hidouci, “Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation” in 
Algeria: Threatening Contradictions, 9 Arab Reform Brief, Arab Reform Initiative,  
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On the other hand, if one considers the victims to be those who were 
massacred, killed in bomb attacks, executed, raped, tortured, and forcibly 
disappeared, as well as the families of these direct victims, 288 the legal 
obligations in question are all too appropriate.289 There are victims who 
affirmatively reject the amnesty law.290 As noted above, the families of 
the disappeared attempted to demonstrate against the Charter prior to the 
referendum.291 On the day of the referendum, in one suburb of the capital 
victims and families who lost their loved ones buried their ballots at a 
                                                                                                             
July 15, 2006, http://www.arab-reform.net/IMG/pdf/Papier_No9_Algerie_anglais_final_ 
ghazi_hidouci.pdf. 
 288. The word, “victims,” henceforth will be used in this sense, unless otherwise  
indicated. 
 289. Even accepting the government’s figures, statistically, the referendum cannot be 
said to account for their wishes with any accuracy. The population of Algeria is currently 
estimated at 33.3 million. Algeria Country Profile, supra note 70. 18.3 million Algerians 
are registered to vote and purportedly the referendum had a 79.76% voter turnout, which 
calculates to approximately 14.6 million who “actually” voted. If 97.36% voted for the 
Charter, then roughly 14.2 million supported it. See Algeria Today, supra note 64. This 
last figure is about 42.6% of the entire population. Compare this with an estimate of the 
number of victims, for which purposes we will assume the worst likely figures. 200,000 
Algerians lost their lives and 8000 were disappeared. Chronology (Part Two), supra note 
51. Women’s rights advocates estimate that approximately 5,000 women were raped. 
Algeria: Human Rights Developments 2000, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/ 
wr2k1/mideast/algeria.html (last viewed Mar. 12, 2008). The author has not encountered 
narrowly estimated figures for tortures. Let us consider that 50,000 citizens were tortured. 
The total number of direct victims then morbidly reaches 263,000. Concerning their  
immediate family members, choosing the year from which to pull the average household 
size in Algeria is problematic, as the ages of the victims vary widely. Some victims had 
families of their own, others were too young. Assuming the former, we will factor by not 
only the average family size from 1966, 5.9 members, but also the more recent  
demographic from 1987, 7 members. Encyclopedia of Nations, Social and Humanitarian 
Assistance, The Family—Society’s Building Block, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com 
/United-Nations/Social-and-Humanitarian-Assistance-THE-FAMILY-SOCIETY-S-BUIL 
DING-BLOCK.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). Thus, there are approximately 3.4  
million victims, which constitute 10.1% of the Algerian populace. 
 290. Although reference to statistics has been made in order to disprove the contention 
that the referendum represents the wishes of the victims, this Note does not advocate their 
use in deciding whether justice should be pursued. In addition to violating established 
legal principles, deferring to majority opinion among victims would present deeply  
problematic moral dilemmas. For example, would a simple majority vote among the  
victims suffice, even if 60% favored amnesty and 40% rejected it, or 70% and 30%,  
respectively? There are victims who support the Charter. See, e.g., Daikha Dridi, Victims 
Groups Question Algeria Amnesty, AL JAZEERA, Sept. 30, 2005, http://english. 
aljazeera.net/English/archive/archive?ArchiveId=14563. However, this should not be 
determinative. 
 291. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, supra note 284. 
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local cemetery in protest.292 And three days after the Charter’s passage 
six groups that support the victims held a shared press conference to  
denounce the amnesty.293 Direct statements from victims and organizers 
of associations express a desire for truth and accountability.294 Formal 
manifestations of dissent have also been articulated. In April 2007, four 
Algerian human rights groups that represent the victims were among the 
organizations that signed an open letter to the Council of the European 
Union, demanding the abrogation of the Charter, and asserting that the 
legislation constitutes a denial of truth and justice for victims of the  
amnestied crimes.295 In addition, the Collectif des Familles de  
Disparu(e)s en Algérie submitted an extensive shadow report before the 
HRC, in which the group requested the body to instruct the Algerian 
government to rescind the Charter.296 The report also asked for “a  
processing of the cases of the disappeared that allows for the effective 
exercise of the right of the families of the disappeared to truth and  
justice, the two existing as an integral part of their right to redress.”297 
                                                                                                             
 292. Id. 
 293. Wendy Kristianasen, Algeria: The Women Speak, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Apr. 
11, 2006, http://mondediplo.com/2006/04/07algeria. 
 294. For example, leader of the Sumūd Association of the Families of Victims  
Abducted by Islamist Armed Groups, Ali Merabet lost his two brothers, Aziz, twenty-
eight years old, and Merzak, fourteen; an Islamist group kidnapped, murdered and buried 
them in a farmyard. While leaving open the possibility for genuine forgiveness among 
victims, Merabet stated: “‘We are not against a national reconciliation, but we do say 
“no” to an amnesty decided in a hurry without going through a process that will recover 
truth and justice.’” Dridi, supra note 290. Similarly, founder of the Collectif des Familles 
de Disparu(e)s en Algérie, Nacéra Dutour, whose son, Amin, was forcibly disappeared, 
voiced her rejection of the Charter: “[It] ended the dreams of truth and justice for  
thousands of families of the disappeared.” Kristianasen, supra note 293. Cherifa Kheddar 
witnessed armed militants haul away her brother and sister. After torturing her brother, 
they murdered both in the family’s home in 1996. Kheddar protests every Sunday with 
other victims in front of the government palace. She reiterated her demands: “‘[O]ur  
position has always been that justice must work first and that those found guilty can be 
pardoned later on . . . [b]ut the national reconciliation gives impunity even to those  
people who have killed hundreds of times.’” Craig S. Smith, Many Algerians Are Not 
Reconciled by Amnesty Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006. 
 295. This statement was supported by the Ligue Algérienne des Droits de l’Homme, 
Ligue Algérienne de Défense des Droits de l’Homme, SOS Disparu, and Collectif des 
Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie. Open Letter at the Occasion of the EU-Algeria  
Association Council, Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://www.euromedrights.net/pages/348/news/focus/28989. 
 296. CFDA Rapport, supra note 272, at 15, 72, 74. 
 297. Id. at 15 (author’s translation). In referencing the Charter’s violation of the right 
to justice, the Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e)s en Algérie cited article 6 of the  
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Prior to the Charter, Algerians sought accountability in overseas 
courts.298 And in lieu of access to courts, Algerian women staged mock 
trials against Islamist opposition groups and figures as well as former 
president Benjedid for crimes against humanity.299 
Thus, the claim that the referendum widely represents the wishes of the 
“victims” is doubtful at best, whether the victims are understood to be 
the Algerian people or those who have suffered crimes and their families. 
The possible concern—or perhaps hypocritical assertion of cultural  
relativism—that a duty to prosecute is yet another patriarchal, colonial 
                                                                                                             
Convention on Disappearance, which requires a state party to hold perpetrators criminally 
responsible.” Id. at 14. 
 298. In April 2001, an Algerian family who lost their son to torture as well as two  
detainees subjected to this abuse filed civil complaints in France against General Khaled 
Nezzar. EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 280–81. Alleging liability for crimes  
committed under his direction, including deaths, acts of torture, internments, and  
disappearances, in July 2002, victims again lodged complaints against Nezzar in a Paris 
criminal court. Press Release, Justitia Universalis, Algérie: Justitia Universalis dépose 
une plainte contre le général Khaled Nezzar (July 1, 2002). And Abderrahmane El Mehdi 
Mosbah, an asylee from Algeria, brought a complaint in December 2003 with the Paris 
public prosecutor against General Larbi Belkheir for the acts of torture he endured for 
forty days in the winter of 2003, charging Belkheir’s responsibility in instigating and 
erecting a policy of torture. Press Release, Justitia Universalis, Algérie: M. A. El Mehdi 
Mosbah et Justitia Universalis déposent plainte contre le général Larbi Belkheir  
(Communiqué de Maître Willian Bourdon, avocat à Paris) (Dec. 10, 2003). See also, e.g., 
Criminal Lawsuits Against Algeria’s Generals, Algeria-Watch, Jan. 2004, http://www. 
algeria-watch.org/en/aw/criminal_lawsuits.htm. 
  A civil action in the United States was also brought. Algerian citizens and the 
Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Democrates (“RAFD”) brought suit in federal  
district court under the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victims Protection Act against 
the FIS and one of its members for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and additional 
breaches of international and domestic law. Plaintiffs included family members of the 
murdered. RAFD sued on behalf of those targeted by Islamist groups. Doe v. Islamic 
Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (D.C. 2003) (granting summary judgment for 
the defendant). 
 299. RANJANA KHANNA, ALGERIA CUTS: WOMEN & REPRESENTATION, 1830 TO THE 
PRESENT 68–70 (2008). For a theoretical reading of “virtual justice” within an Algerian 
context, see id. at 68–99. 
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imposition on Algeria is misplaced.300 Many victims desire truth and  
justice,301 and they believe the Charter extinguishes both. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Algerian state passed the Charter in February 2006, the  
country’s fourth grant of amnesty, has Algeria enjoyed peace? December 
10, 2006: A bomb goes off on a bus with foreign oil workers, killing two 
people. February 13, 2007: Seven bombs explode, killing six people. 
April 10, 2007: Bombs explode in Algiers, killing thirty-three people. 
July 11, 2007: A suicide bomb blows up a vehicle close to an army  
barrack, killing eight people. September 6, 2007: A suicide bomb  
detonates before a presidential visit, killing twenty. September 8, 2007: 
A car bomb goes off at a coastguard barracks, killing thirty people.302 
                                                                                                             
 300. While acknowledging that the universality of human rights norms can be  
challenged, for purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that this particular issue 
does not seem to be a preoccupation for the majority of Algerians. For an interesting 
analysis of Islamic law’s emphasis on duties and their relation to human rights, see Jason 
Morgan-Foster, Note, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the  
International Human Rights Movement, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 67 (2005). 
 301. At minimum, under the International Covenant, Algeria has a duty to investigate 
and reveal sufficient information to victims and their families. Supra note 105. A  
customary right to truth appears to be budding. See Yasmin Naqvi, The Right to the Truth 
in International Law: Fact or Fiction? 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 245, 254–67 (2006). 
For a sketching of the parameters of this right, see id. at 262–63. 
  The relation “between” truth and justice is hotly contested. Id. at 269–72. At least 
one scholar has suggested, for example, that the process of communally approaching “the 
truth” may be an adequate form of justice itself. See Slye, supra note 130, at 246–47. 
This is the often-touted model of “restorative justice,” which South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is supposed to represent. Some have championed restorative 
justice to the exclusion of criminal accountability in transitional states emerging from 
turmoil, frequently engaging in an ironic tug of war over perceptions of victims’ needs, 
which they argue are better honored by the former of the two models. Aside from having 
a polarizing effect, choosing truth over justice or vice versa is unnecessary. A balanced 
approach is possible and should be supported. For a collection of works on the topic, see 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE 
SEARCH FOR TRUTH (William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004). A strong illustra-
tion of the two’s co-existence can be found in Sierra Leone’s experience. See William A. 
Shabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE 
TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 3 (William A. Schabas 
& Shane Darcy eds., 2004) (“The real lesson of the Sierra Leone experiment is that truth 
commissions and courts can work productively together, even if they only work in  
parallel.”). 
 302. Chronology—Armed Attacks and Bombings in Maghreb States, Reuters, Jan. 29, 
2008. The September 6th attack was carried out by a boy only fifteen years old. Salima 
Tlemçaci, Attentat suicide contre la caserne de Dellys (Boumerdes), EL WATAN, Sept. 10, 
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December 11, 2007: Two bombs explode in the capital near the  
Constitutional Council and offices of the U.N., killing an estimated six-
ty.303 Meanwhile, state security forces have continued to detain and tor-
ture people.304 As a result of ongoing fighting, 400 people, including 
many civilians, were killed in 2006,305 and the following year witnessed 
the deaths of 300 people, at least seventy of whom were civilians.306 In 
assessing the causes of the recent bombings, analysts have drawn  
attention to poverty, pervasive unemployment, and broad alienation from 
politics in Algeria.307 These deeper causes of violence serve as a  
reminder that amnesty is not the panacea for meaningful peace,308 an  
observation at least some Algerians appear to support.309 
A shrewd politician, Boutiflika has been mindful of the complex host 
of issues confronting Algeria, seeking to revamp the country politically 
and economically310 and strengthening the presidency311 at the expense of 
                                                                                                             
2007, http://www.elwatan.com. There is one main lingering group that is suspected to be 
responsible, the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, which changed its name 
from the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat in early 2007. 
 303. “Dozens killed” in Algeria Blasts, BBC, Dec. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/africa/7137997.stm. 
 304. Algeria: Briefing to the Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, Sept. 
2007, 1–2, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/AI-Algeria.pdf. 
 305. Annual Report for Algeria 2006, supra note 284. 
 306. Annual Report for Algeria 2007, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa. 
org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2007&c=DZA (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). 
 307. William McLean, Algeria Rebel Attacks Test Government Security Policy, Reu-
ters, Sept. 23, 2007. 
 308. In keeping with this insight, a prominent scholar on Algeria stated:  
Turning the page on this decade without seeking to understand the 
mechanisms which pushed the society of this young state into self-
destruction would constitute a headlong rush toward unforeseeable 
political consequences. The mourning process of Algerian society 
can be brought to closure only by acknowledging the drama that has 
taken place, and by a political willingness to bring justice to all those 
who have been its victims. 
Luis Martinez, Why the Violence in Algeria? J. N. AFR. STUD. 14, 26 (2004) (arguing that 
“the failure of democratic transition” is the central factor in explaining what gave rise to 
the violence). 
 309. Concerning Algerians’ reactions to the bombings, a survey conducted by the  
independent daily newspaper, El Khabar, revealed that 76% of the 10,016 questioned “do 
[not] think that national reconciliation is sufficient to confront the recent terrorist  
outbreak.” Djalel Bouâti, La réconciliation ne peut pas, à elle seule, venir à bout du  
terrorisme, AL KHABAR, Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.elkhabar.com (author’s translation). 
 310. For a look at Boutiflika’s efforts to improve Algeria’s foreign relations and  
prospects for foreign investments, see Yahia H. Zoubir, The Resurgence of Algeria’s 
Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century 9 J. N. AFR. STUD. 169 (2004). 
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the army. Engaging in a power struggle with this historically dominant 
faction,312 Boutiflika was able to use the disclosures of its tactics during 
the Dirty War in order to leverage not only the army’s retreat from  
politics and a rearrangement of its command, but also the retirement of 
the generals who waged the 1992 coup and subsequent campaign of  
terror.313 However, this balance of power is precarious, as the generals 
have sought to develop their own influential networks, especially with 
those sympathetic to the “war on terror.”314 Efforts at overhauling a  
profoundly defective judiciary have also been initiated.315 In January 
2000, Boutiflika created the National Commission for Judicial Reform, 
which produced a report that included recommendations he vowed to 
follow. After its release, Boutiflika dismissed several judges on  
corruption charges and the majority of magistrates. The President  
identified three key relevant phases, improving prison conditions, the 
quality of magistrates, and the independence of the courts.316 
While these initiatives are positive, Algeria undeniably has a long and 
daunting path ahead towards establishing truth as well as justice for the 
crimes committed during its conflict. Regardless of the barriers to be 
faced, however, international law, both in treaty and custom, requires 
that justice be served after certain occurrences. Algeria’s treaty  
obligations establish the invalidity of the Charter, as perpetrators of gross 
violations of human rights must be prosecuted and punished under the 
Convention Against Torture, International Covenant, and African  
Charter. Similarly, grave war crimes and crimes against humanity may 
                                                                                                             
 311. An early assessment, optimistic of Boutiflika’s strengthening of the presidency 
can be located at Robert Mortimer, Boutiflika and Algeria’s Path from Revolt to  
Reconciliation 99 CURRENT HIST. 10 (2000). 
 312. Ulla Holm, Algeria: President Bouteflika’s Second Presidential Term, Dansk 
Institut for International Studier (November 2004). 
 313. After serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs during what most Algerians consider 
to have been the country’s golden era, the Houari Boumedienne years (1965–1978), Bou-
tiflika lived in exile from 1981 until 1987 and then ran as an independent candidate 
backed by the military in the 1999 presidential elections. Boutiflika’s apparent lack of 
involvement in the regime’s violence was partly perceived as a source of legitimacy. 
EVANS & PHILLIPS, supra note 30, at 255–56; STORA, supra note 11, at 145, 259–61.  
 314. Hugh Roberts, Demilitarizing Algeria, 12–18, Carnegie Papers No. 86, Middle 
East Program (May 2007). 
 315. For perspectives on the Algerian judiciary and the challenges it faces from two 
American judges who visited Algeria as part of independent reform efforts, see Hon. 
James G. Glazebrook, Judicial Independence in the Democratic Republic of Algeria, 43 
No. 1 JUDGES’ J. 44 (2004); Joseph P. Nadeau, Algeria 2001: Quest for Democracy, 40 
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Algeria, 7 J. N. AFR. STUD. 23, 32–36 (2002). 
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not be amnestied under general international law. Concerns that the  
customary duty to prosecute will perpetuate conflict and destabilize  
societies should not dictate exceptions to the rule. Permitting legal  
concessions to political expediency fails to account for the slackening 
over the long-term of any apparent tensions between peace and justice, 
and the effects of this norm are far less drastic than are sometimes  
assumed. 
In passing the Charter, Algeria breached the customary obligation to 
prosecute, as the crimes it amnestied were not only war crimes, but also 
crimes against humanity. Disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial  
killings committed by state forces, and murder perpetrated by armed 
groups are within this latter class of crimes. Concerning Algerians’  
response to the amnestying of these crimes, even if it were legal to hold a 
referendum on this issue—and it is not—the results of the plebiscite on 
the Charter are not genuinely representative of domestic opinion. More 
importantly, consideration should be given to the voices of those who 
have more directly suffered, Algerians who were tortured or raped,  
Algerians whose family members were disappeared, killed or massacred. 
The Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation has brought neither 
peace, nor reconciliation. When will the Algerian state seek peace with 
its people? When will it reconcile itself with the law? 
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